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A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
ENCRYPTION EXPORT REGULATIONS:
SOFTWARE IS SPEECHLESS
INTRODUCTION
The world isn't run by weapons any more, or energy or money; it's
run by little ones and zeros, little bits of data. It's all just electrons
... there's a war out there old friend, a world war, and it's not about
who's got the most bullets; it's about who controls the information,
what we see and hear, how we work, what we think; it's all about
the information.'
Historically, governments throughout the world used encryption
technology to protect military secrets.2 Today such software has
evolved into an invaluable tool for individuals and businesses requir-
ing "authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity of electronic communi-
cations and transactions ' 3 on the Internet.4 While the government is
concerned with ensuring public safety, individuals and businesses are
concerned with protecting proprietary or confidential information, ex-
1. SNEAKERS (Universal 1992).
2. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE
CODE IN C xv (1994) ("For many years .... cryptography was the exclusive domain of the mili-
tary."); Marcia S. Smith, Encryption Technology: Congressional Issues, CRS ISSUE BRIEF (Cong.
Res. Serv.), Oct. 20, 1997, at 1, 1; J. Terrence Stender, Note, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the
Control of Strong Crypto and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287,
289 (1998) ("Typically, emphasis has been on the protection of state or military secrets and, of
course, the collection and exploitation of adversaries' secrets.") (footnote omitted); see HARRY
HOWE RANSOM, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 116 (1959) ("Problems as
old as intelligence itself are the secure communicating of secret information and the interception
of such information transmitted by foreign governments or their espionage agents. The use of
professional code makers and code breakers is perhaps as old as diplomacy and espionage.");
Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, The Continuing Debate Over Encryption Software, 220 N.Y.
L.J. 3, 3 (1998), available in LEXIS, Legal News Library, NYLAWJ File ("At one time, encryp-
tion technology was only used by the military and the government to protect state secrets as well
as to access private information held by others.").
3. Raysman & Brown, supra note 2, at 3. "During the last twenty years, there has been an
explosion of public academic research in cryptography. For the first time, state-of-the-art com-
puter cryptography is being practiced outside the secured walls of the military agencies."
SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at xv; see Stender, supra note 2, at 289 ("[W]ith the rapid advances in
computer technology over the last fifty years and the new vulnerability that technology has
brought with it, encryption technology has become a valued tool for both businesses and individ-
uals in the protection of proprietary and personal information.").
4. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 2, at 3; see also Stender, supra note 2, at 288, 290 ("[The]
interests, whether it be government, business or individual,... are not necessarily at odds ....
Secure communications, secure data storage, individual privacy and a robust economy are with
little doubt within the most basic national interest.").
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ploiting a potentially profitable technology, and preserving the consti-
tutional right to privacy and freedom of speech.5 In an attempt to
satisfy the burden of protecting public safety, the government has
placed national security controls on the export of encryption technol-
ogy. 6 These controls are continuously challenged as, among other
things, a violation of individual freedom of speech.7
Two recent cases encapsulate this First Amendment debate. In
Bernstein v. United States Department of State,8 Judge Marilyn Patel
ruled that the new export regulations violated the First Amendment
as a prior restraint on speech.9 In a prior decision, Judge Charles R.
Richey, in Karn v. United States Department of State,10 found the
software source code and the author's written comments speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Applying the O'Brien test," how-
ever, the court found the government regulation was justified, as it
was narrowly tailored to the goal of limiting the proliferation of cryp-
tographic products. 12
Part I of this Comment provides a background of software and
cryptography. 13 Part II details the government regulations and poli-
cies controlling the export of cryptographic technology. 14 Part III dis-
5. See Sean M. Flynn, A Puzzle Even The Codebreakers Have Trouble Solving: A Clash of
Interests Over The Electronic Encryption Standard, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 217, 218 (1995);
see also Stender, supra note 2, at 320.
There is little question that enormous advances in telecommunications in the fifty years
have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and
integrity of business and personal communications. However, at the same time, these
same advances seriously threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to intercept a broad range of signal intelligence targets, for instance, narcotraf-
fickers, organized crime, terrorists, and foreign espionage agents. Diverse interests are
in diametric opposition to each other: industry's right to sell and the public's right to
use crypto versus the government's duty to protect.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The
Clipper Chip, and The Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 718-34 (1995) (presenting examples
of society's need for encryption technology to protect communications and provide data security
today and in the future). The list of interested parties and their respective concerns are not all
inclusive. The list merely serves to introduce the players and conflicting interests relevant to the
focus of this Comment. The privacy and commercial profitability debates are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
6. See infra Part II.
7. The export regulations have also been challenged as an obstacle to commercial profitabil-
ity. "[Glovernmental policy regulating this technology is beginning to pose some very serious
commercial concerns." Stender, supra note 2, at 320.
8. 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
9. Id. at 1308.
10. 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
11. See infra Part III.E.
12. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 12.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
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cusses Supreme Court guidelines for interpreting what speech is
protected under the First Amendment. 15 Part IV examines the Bern-
stein and Karn encryption opinions regarding government export con-
trols on data-scrambling software under the confines of the First
Amendment.16 Part V presents a First Amendment analysis of en-
cryption source code as protected speech.17 Specifically, this section
first argues that encryption software is not speech. Second, Part V
proposes that even if software is speech, software is not speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Finally, Part .V suggests that even if
software is speech protected under the First Amendment, software is
expressive conduct and thus is afforded limited First Amendment pro-
tection. Part VI suggests the impact of case precedent and proposed
legislation on future lawsuits. 18 Part VII concludes that the First
Amendment does not prohibit government export controls on encryp-
tion software. 19
I. TECHNOLOGY
A. Software
We do not need to have an infinity of different machines doing dif-
ferent jobs. A single one will suffice. The engineering problem of
producing various machines for various jobs is replaced by the office
work of 'programming' the universal machine to do these jobs.20
Software consists of programs that enable a computer to function as
multiple computers with various capabilities. 2' Interestingly, the gen-
esis of computer technology did not utilize computer programs as a
means of operation.22 The computer would be wired by hand to per-
form one task at a time.23 When a different task was desired, com-
puter engineers were required to rewire the machine, consequentially
causing many days of computer downtime.24 The development of pro-
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See infra Part VII.
20. ANDREW HODGES, ALAN TURING: THE ENIGMA 293 (1983).
21. Pamela Samuelson, Contu Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection For Computer
Programs In Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 679-81.
22. Id. at 673-74.
23. Id. at 674.
24. Id. at 674 n.33; see id. at 674. The first electronic computer developed in 1945, called the
Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator ("ENIAC"), performed its functions one at a
time in a prescribed order. Id. For each different operation, "ENIAC had to be manually re-
wired, like an old wire-and-plug telephone switch board, a task that could take several days." Id.
at 674 n.33 (citing Frederic Golden, Big Dimwits and Little Geniuses, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 30).
1998]
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grams, therefore, was a major breakthrough in the evolution of the
computer.25 Computers were able to store and use programs to per-
form particular tasks, thereby eliminating the need for hardware mod-
ifications every time an additional task was desired.2 6 One of the most
significant results of this development was that computers became
"universal machines. T27 In other words, a computer could perform
any task capable of being broken down into program instructions.2 8
Software programs are developed to run a process or perform a
function.29 "Software is that which empowers a computer to handle
25. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 674 ("An important development in the history of com-
puters was that a computer could be made to store and use encoded instructions, 'programs,' to
perform particular tasks, thus eliminating the necessity for making modifications to the hardware
of the machine to change the tasks that it could perform.") (footnote omitted).
It is possible to construct a customized piece of hardware to do any given task that
might otherwise be programmed on a universal machine. A completely hardwired
machine may do that given task more rapidly than a programmed computer. The prime
advantage of the programmable computer is its generality. That is, it does away with
the need to construct many different kinds of machines because one machine can be
built and programmed to perform a variety of functions. Another of the implications of
the development of programmable computers is that such computers were built so that
the hardware itself could no longer perform any useful function without the directions
given to it by a computer program.
Id. at 675; see Hoo-Min D. Toong & Amar Gupta, Personal Computers, Sci. AM., Dec. 1982, at
87, 88 ("The hardware can do nothing by itself; it requires the array of programs, or instructions,
collectively called software.").
26. Samuelson, supra note 21, at 674 (citing David A. Patterson, Microprogramming, ScI.
AM., Mar. 1983, at 50, 52) ("The principle of the stored program, the invention of which was a
milestone in the development of the modern digital computer, makes it possible to change the
function of a computer by changing the contents of its memory unit instead of by changing its
hardware.").
27. Id. (defining universal machines as "machines capable of performing any task for which it
was possible to create program instructions").
It is possible to construct a customized piece of hardware to do any given task that
might otherwise be programmed on a universal machine .... The prime advantage of
the programmable computer is its generality. That is, it does away with the need to
construct many different kinds of machines because one machine can be built and
programmed to perform a variety of functions.
Id. at 675.
28. Id. at 674; see, e.g., HODGES, supra note 20, at 318-21; see also Samuelson, supra note 21, at
675 n.36 ("While many modern computers are programmed to perform only one function-
running the watch you wear on your wrist, for instance-they may be capable of being program-
med to do any number of different things.").
29. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 676.
Properly programmed, the hardware can perform the series of steps necessary to ac-
complish a task as directed by the program.
One could say that the set of instructions which constitutes a computer program gives
the machine the "knowledge" it needs to do the task, but this is using the word "knowl-
edge" in a very different sense from that in which it is normally used. A more accurate
way to describe a program would be to say that the program's instructions simply pre-
scribe an order for the hardware's execution of its primitive functions. This is, at base,
the definition of a program.
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information and to control information flow."'30 Additionally, others
have defined software as a machine with both a program in passive
text and a program capable of active execution. 31 When a computer
programmer designs a system to perform a specific function or func-
tions, he or she must then build the actual computer code that will
make up the components enabling the system to operate. 32 Other
than special purpose components, the program is written in what is
known as "source code."'33
Source code, the passive text, is a high level code34 that presents a
precise set of operating instructions enabling a computer to perform
specific functions. 35 This code may also include comments written by
the programmer describing what the code is about.36 A computer,
however, does not directly read source code.37 Commercially avail-
able software compiles the source code instructions into "object
code," also referred to as "machine" level code,38 written in zeros and
ones.39 This code is read by the computer, enabling it to perform the
specified functions. 40
The principle function of source code is to provide a compiler with
sufficient information to produce an "executable" computer pro-
Id.
30. GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS 50 (1995).
31. DAVID GELERNTER & SURESH JAGANNATHAN, PROGRAMMING LINGUISTICS 1, 1-2 (1990).
The program text represents the machine before it has been turned on. The executing
program represents the powered-up machine in active operation. There is no funda-
mental distinction between the passive program text and the active executing program,
just as there is none between a machine before and after it is turned on.
Id. at 2.
32. STOBBS, supra note 30, at 66.
33. Id. Programmers who write source code have a variety of computer languages to choose
from. The programmer selects a particular language because it is most efficient and effective for
the required function of the finished software, or the client for whom the software is being
developed requested a specific language be used, or simply because it is the form which the
developer is most familiar. Id.
34. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1263-64 (Anthony Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly
eds., 3d ed. 1993).
35. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 680. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the function software provides.
36. STOBBS, supra note 30, at 170.
37. Id. at 68.
38. PETER D. JUNGER, COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 12 (1996); Samuelson, supra note 21, at
683.
39. STOBBS, supra note 30, at 68. This form is also known as binary code. Id.
40. See id. at 171 (summarizing the function of source code as a "list of instructions, written in
a selected computer language, and then converted into computer machine language, which the
computer uses to build the software machine described by the instructions ... the source code is
simply a detailed blueprint telling the computer how to assemble those components into the
software machine").
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gram.41 The users of the programs, for the most part, do not care
what the software says to the computer. 42 Furthermore, the code writ-
ten by the developer is not easily read by even the most experienced
programmers. 43 For that reason, patent attorneys are advised not to
rely on source code for an understanding of the program.44 "Even
with well-documented comments, one person's source code can be dif-
ficult for another person to read and comprehend. Therefore, it is
best not to rely entirely on source code in describing a software inven-
tion in the specification. '45 Deciphering someone else's source code is
an extremely time-consuming task,46 and therefore the function of
various source codes can be found written in textbooks and other
printed media.
B. Cryptography
A cryptographic 47 program is commonly used software that has two
basic functions: encoding (or encryption) and decoding (or decryp-
tion). 48 Encryption source code is defined as "a precise set of operat-
ing instructions to a computer that, when compiled, allows for the
execution of an encryption function on a computer. ' 49 Encryption ob-
ject code is defined as "computer programs containing an encryption
source code that has been compiled into a form, of code that can be
directly executed by a computer to perform an encryption function. ' 50
The encryption process converts a readable message, artfully known
as "plaintext," 51 into unintelligible data traditionally known as
"ciphertext. ' '52 The program then decodes the "ciphertext" back into
41. Id. at 170.
42. Samuelson, supra note 21, at 682. "The user does not care how the program does what it
does, just that it does what it is supposed to do." Id. Notably, a program's object code may be
the only form of the code available in the market. "[O]nce the program is operating correctly,
the source code becomes superfluous. Only the machine-readable version is generally distrib-
uted." Id. at 681-82 n.67.
43. STOBBS, supra note 30, at 240 (describing the process of deciphering someone else's source
code as a time-consuming undertaking).
44. Id. at 170, 240.
45. Id. at 170.
46. Id. at 240.
47. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 1 (defining cryptography as "[t]he art and science of keeping
messages secure" and encryption as "[tihe process of disguising a message in such a way as to
hide its substance").
48. Lance Hoffman, Cryptography: Policy and Technology Trends (visited Oct. 16, 1997)
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/crypto-policydoe94.report>.
49. 61 Fed. Reg. 68,585, 68,585 (1997) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 772).
50. Id.
51. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 1; 61 Fed. Reg. at 68,585.
52. Smith, supra note 2, at 1; see SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 1 (defining an encrypted message
as ciphertext).
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"plaintext" through the process of decryption. 53 The encryption and
decryption functions are made possible by compatible "keys." 54
These keys are a sequence of bits55 which act as passwords and are
given to both the sender and receiver of the message so that the text
may be encrypted and decrypted. 56 The keys ensure that the sender
and receiver are actually who they claim to be. 57 The longer the se-
quence, the more difficult the message is to break without the compat-
ible key.58
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. Prior Regulatory Framework
The International Traffic In Arms Regulations ("ITAR") imple-
mented the Arms Export Control Act ("AECA"), which in turn sets
forth the United States Munitions List ("USML"). 59 Part 121 of the
ITAR presents the USML, which defines those items to be designated
as "defense articles."'60 Congress enacted the AECA in response to
53. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 1.
54. Smith, supra note 2, at 1.
55. Bits is short for "binary digits." See John Bylinsky, The Next Battle in Memory Chips,
FORTUNE, May 16, 1983, at 152.
56. Smith, supra note 2, at 1. One author offered a simple hypothetical facilitating an under-
standing of the relationship between the stages of cryptography:
Sam (the sender) wishes to send his friend Ruth (the receiver) a personal message.
Sam types his message into the computer as plaintext and then uses a previously agreed
upon key to encode the message into ciphertext. Sam then sends the message to Ruth.
Once Ruth receives the message in ciphertext form, she uses the previously agreed
upon key to decode the message into plaintext. At this point, Ruth is able to read her
personal message.
Jason Kerben, The Dilemma for Future Communication Technologies: How to Constitutionally
Dress the Crypto-Genie, 5 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 125, 125 (1997).
57. For example, in the hypothetical in note 56, the keys will ensure that Ruth is the receiver
as Sam intended and Sam is the sender as Ruth intended.
58. "[T]he sizes of encryption keys are measured in bits and the difficulty of trying all possible
keys grows exponentially with the number of bits used. Adding one bit to the key doubles the
number of possible keys; adding ten increases it by a factor of more than a thousand." Matt
Blaze, Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security
(visited Oct. 15, 1997) <http://www.cdt.org/crypto/>.
59. 22 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1998).
60. Id. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1). The ITAR refers to "technical data" as an item subject to
the licensing requirement. Technical data is information "which is required for the design[,]
development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance, or
modification of defense articles." 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (1996), revised by 61 Fed. Reg. 48,831
(1996). However, technical data, for purposes of the ITAR, that are deemed to be in the public
domain, are not subject to the restriction. See id. § 120.11. If information is deemed in the
public domain, this means it is published and generally accessible or available to the public
through sales, subscriptions, and libraries. Id. A printed book or other printed material setting
forth encryption source code is not itself subject to the Export Regulations and thus is outside
the scope of the licensing requirement. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(2) (1998). Notably, however, en-
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developing national security concerns. 61 The proliferation and deliv-
ery of "unconventional" weapons "pose[d] an urgent threat to security
and stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. '62 The
AECA authorized the President to regulate the import and export of
"defense articles" and "defense services," and to designate such arti-
cles and services for inclusion on the USML. 63 Pursuant to 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(h), this designation by the President, or a party to whom the
President has delegated such authority, is not subject to judicial re-
view.64 Articles designated by the President as defense articles and
defense services are prohibited from international import or export
without a license, except as otherwise provided.65 The President dele-
gated his authority regarding the export of defense articles and serv-
ices to the Secretary of State pursuant to Executive Order 11,958.66 In
cryption source code in electronic form or media remains subject to the Regulations. See id.
§ 734.3(b)(3). Scannable materials also remain subject to the licensing requirement where the
government deems necessary. 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572, 68,575 (1996); see, e.g., Interview by Dan
Charles with Edward Apell, Director, F.B.I. Counter Intelligence, All Things Considered, (Na-
tional Public Radio, Sept. 28, 1995), cited in Kerben, supra note 56, at 141 n.182.
61. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994). In the 1980s, nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region
were responsible for nearly half of the global import and export of weapons and related equip-
ment and services. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-138, § 401(1), 105 Stat. 647, 718 (1991). Nations in this region are the "principal market for
the worldwide arms trade." Id. The continued reproduction of such weapons, equipment and
services facilitate an arms race in these areas where the political, economic, and military environ-
ments are precarious. Id. § 401(3). "[Fjuture security and stability in the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf region would be enhanced by establishing a stable military balance among regional
powers by restraining and reducing both conventional and unconventional weapons." Id.
§ 401(6). "[S]ecurity, stability, peace, and prosperity in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region
are important to the welfare of the international economy and to the national security interests
of the United States." Id. § 401(7). The purpose of § 402, the Multilateral Arms Transfer and
Control Regime, includes:
[T]o slow and limit the proliferation of conventional weapons in the Middle East and
Persian gulf region...
... [T]o halt the proliferation of unconventional weapons, including nuclear, biologi-
cal, and chemical weapons, as well as delivery systems associated with those weapons
and the technologies necessary to produce or assemble such weapons...
... [T]o maintain the military balance in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region
through reductions of conventional weapons and the elimination of unconventional
weapons ...
Id. § 402(b). Major military equipment referred to in the code is defined as "defense articles and
defense services." Id. § 402(d)(7). For further discussion of the government's national security
concerns, see infra Part II.C.
62. Foreign Relations Authorization Act § 401(4).
63. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994).
64. Id. § 2778(h).
65. Id. § 2778(a)(2).
66. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (1998).
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turn, the Secretary of State re-delegated this authority to the Secre-
tary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs.67
B. Jurisdiction Transfer and the Current Government Regulations
Effective November 15, 1996, pursuant to Executive Order 13,026,68
control of all nonmilitary encryption items on the USML 69 was trans-
ferred from the Department of State to the Department of Com-
merce,70 and all nonmilitary encryption items were to be added to the
Commerce Control List ("CCL").71 The explanation of the executive
order in the White House Press Release stated: "[T]he export of en-
cryption software, like the export of other encryption products de-
scribed in this section, must be controlled because of such software's
functional capacity, rather than because of any possible informational
value of such software. 72
The Commerce Department regulations ("Export Regulations")
control the export of certain software.73 The Export Regulations pro-
hibit the export of certain encryption software outside the United
States unless complex precautions are taken.74 Posting software on
the Internet is considered to be an export under the regulations. 75
The regulations impose additional restrictions which require a license
to provide technical assistance to foreign persons with the intent to aid
them in the foreign development of items that domestically would be
67. Id.
68. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. 228 (1996-97).
69. Part 121 of the ITAR sets forth the United States Munitions List. 22 C.F.R. pt. 121. De-
fense articles are listed in Category XIII(b)(1).
Information Security Systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, software, and
components specifically designed or modified therefor, including: (1) Cryptographic
(including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated cir-
cuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidenti-
ality of information or information systems, except cryptographic equipment and
software.
22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XIII(b)(1) (1996), amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 56,895, 68,633 (1997).
70. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. 228.
71. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 774 (Supp. 11998). Regulatory authority over the export of most encryp-
tion products was transferred from the Department of State under the ITAR to the Department
of Commerce under the Export Administration Regulations. Id.
72. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 3 C.F.R. 228.
73. Export is defined as "an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the [Export
Administration Regulations ("EAR")] out of the United States, or release of technology or
software subject to the EAR to a foreign national in the United States." 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(1)
(1998). Export includes various forms of electronic transfers such as "downloading, or causing
the downloading of, . . . software to locations . . . outside the [United States]." Id.
§ 734.2(b)(9)(B)(ii).
74. Id. § 734.2(b)(9).
75. Id. § 734.2(b)(9)(ii)(B).
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controlled under other codified regulations. 76 Encryption software is
also one item defined as a "defense article" for purposes of regulation
under the AECA:
Software includes but is not limited to the system functional design,
logic flow, algorithms, application programs, operating systems and
support software for design, implementation, test, operation, diag-
nosis and repair. A person who intends to export software only
should, unless it is specifically enumerated in § 121.1 ... apply for a
technical data license pursuant to part 125 of this subchapter.77
The Export Regulations provide official procedures required to ob-
tain approval for exporting items on the CCL.78 To engage in such
export, one must first submit a commodity classification request 79 to
the Bureau of Export Administration ("BXA"). 80 Export Control
Classification Numbers are assigned to all items on the CCL and the
BXA regulations specify three categories of controlled Encryption
Items. 81 Software under Export Classification Numbers 5A002,
5D002 and 5E002 require licenses for export to all foreign destina-
tions except Canada. 82 The regulation provides that after a one-time
review by the BXA, licensing exceptions will be available for commer-
cial items such as key recovery software and commodities and non-
recovery encryption items up to fifty-six bit key length DES83 or
equivalent strength software.84 This exception, however, requires that
the developer commit to developing recoverable items, also known as
76. Id. § 736.2(b)(7)(ii); Id. § 744.9(a). The encryption regulations define technology as the
"technical data or technical assistance necessary for the development or use of a product." 22
C.F.R.. § 121.1(b)(1) (1996), amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 56,895, 68,633 (1997).
77. 22 C.F.R § 121.8(0 (1998).
78. 15 C.F.R. pts. 740-44 (1998).
79. 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (1998). This procedural requirement is referred to as a commodity juris-
diction request. Id. An item for export must be submitted to the Department of State for a
determination whether the item is covered by the USML according to the ITAR or the Depart-
ment of Commerce under the EAR. Id. § 120.4(a). This procedure is not intended to determine
whether the item may or may not be exported. Rather, it is merely to determine whether the
particular commodity is covered by the USML and therefore, whether its export is controlled
pursuant to the AECA and the ITAR. Id.
80. 15 C.F.R. pts. 740-44.
81. Export Classification Number 5A002 encompasses encryption commodities, Classification
Number 5D002 covers encryption software, and Classification Number 5E002 covers encryption
technology. Id. § 742.15(a).
82. Id. The executive order mandating government control of encryption technology explains
that the export of encryption products could harm "national security, foreign policy, and law
enforcement interests." Id. § 742.15.
83. DES stands for Data Encryption Standard. Marc Davis, Get The Message?, J. MARSHALL
COMMENT, Winter 1997/98, at 39, 39.
84. 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(3).
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key recovery. 85 "By virtue of holding or having access to a 'back-
door' key, the government is willing to let stronger crypto out into the
mainstream or in other words, allow the export of strong crypto. ' '8 6
"Key recovery is ...essentially about resolving a fundamental di-
lemma of encryption-that is, allowing the use of robust algorithms
with long keys, while at the same time providing for code breaking
under controlled conditions, for instance, by government officials with
a court order. '87
C. Government National Security Concerns
Secrecy is a form of power. The ability to protect a secret, to
preserve one's privacy, is a form of power. The ability to penetrate
secrets, to learn them, to use them, is also a form of power. Secrecy
empowers, secrecy protects, secrecy hurts. The ability to learn a
person's secrets without her knowledge-to pierce a person's pri-
vacy in secret-is a greater power stills s
Undeniably, secured communications are essential in today's age of
technology. Encryption technology is an invaluable tool necessary for
security in electronic communications. As the appreciation for the
technology increases, the industry for public encryption devices
emerges. It is the growth of this industry that concerns the United
States government. The federal government perceives this industry as
a threat to national security interests.
The National Security Agency ("NSA") maintains the security of
federal communications and data and ensures that the government is
85. Id: § 742.15(b)(2). Encryption products scramble messages using mathematical sequences.
See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 2. A corresponding key is needed to unscramble, or decrypt, the
message. Id. Recoverable items, such as key escrow or key recovery, means that when data is
encrypted a third party retains a copy of the key required to unscramble the information. Smith,
supra note 2, at 2. The key is retained in an "escrow" by the third party assigned. See Dorothy
E. Denning, The U.S. Key Escrow Encryption Technology, COMPUTER COMM., July 1994, re-
printed in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 111 (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1995) (demonstrating the basic
methodology of key escrow). Such a recovery system facilitates parties when a key is lost, stolen,
or tampered with in any way. Smith, supra note 2, at 2; see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 284-85 (Kenneth W. Dam &
Herb S. Lin eds., 1996). "Escrow became a compromise between the needs of the U.S. national
security establishment and the concerns of individuals and businesses." Encryption Export:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of
William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary for Export Administration). Opponents continue to de-
bate over what the government's role in the determination of who the third party key holders
(key recovery agents) should be, and to what extent law enforcement agencies could obtain the
key if unlawful activity is suspected. Id.
86. Stender, supra note 2, at 298 (citing Encryption Export: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade, supra note 85).
87. Stender, supra note 2, at 307.
88. Froomkin, supra note 5, at 712 (footnotes omitted).
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able to intercept and decipher foreign states' codes. 89 The NSA has
provided the United States over fifty years of cryptographic services. 90
During World War II, a former United States Army intelligence NSA
member decrypted a Japanese code, providing the United States with
a rewarding strategic advantage and resulting in Coral Sea and Mid-
way victories. 91 Another NSA predecessor decrypted Japanese
messages, albeit not soon enough, forewarning of the bombing of
Pearl Harbor.92 In the early 1960s, the NSA warned the United States
of Soviet missions to install offensive missiles in Cuba.93 The NSA has
also played a primary role in designing encryption export control pol-
icy. "[T]he State Department relies almost entirely on the NSA to
determine what products are subject to a licensing requirement and
the licensing policy for such items. ' 94 The NSA is concerned that the
development of the public cryptography industry will threaten its se-
curity missions. Continuous growth in private cryptology research
could greatly undermine the NSA's control of the science. 95 Private.
development and reverse engineering, or dissemination, of crypto-
graphic algorithms could alert foreign communicators of flaws in the
United States foreign coding system, thereby encouraging foreign par-
ties to modify their codes. 96 These modifications would prevent the
NSA from monitoring and deciphering foreign messages-messages
potentially carrying terrorist strategies. 97 Finally, the NSA is con-
cerned that the availability of public cryptography abroad would ex-
ploit weaknesses in federal code systems or facilitate foreign nations'
89. The Government's Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong. 423-26 (1980) (testimony of Adm. B. R.
Inman, Director, National Security Agency). More specifically, NSA is responsible for protect-
ing U.S. government information through code creation, intercepting and deciphering foreign
communications, and monitoring global messages in and out of the United States. See Espio-
nage Laws and Leaks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 25 (1979) (testimony of Daniel B. Silver, General
Counsel, National Security Agency).
90. For a detailed discussion of the NSA and its operations, see generally JAMES BAMFORD,
THE PUZZLE PALACE (1982).
91. Id. at 43.
92. Id. at 35-39. Unfortunately the military commanders received the messages without suffi-
cient time to prevent the catastrophic occurrence. Id. at 39.
93. Id. at 215.
94. James B. Altman & William McGlone, Demystifying U.S. Encryption Export Controls, 46
AM. U. L. REv. 493, 499 (1996) (footnote omitted).
95. Admiral B. R. Inman, The NSA Perspective on Telecommunications Protection in the
Nongovernmental Sector, Address to the Armed Services Communications and Electronics As-
sociation (Mar. 1979), cited in Kenneth J. Pierce, Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls,
and the First Amendment: A Need for Legislation, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 202 (1984).
96. Id. at 202-03.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93,
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rapid advancement of decrypting federal codes.98 Intercepting and
exploiting foreign secrets communicated through electronic signals is
essential to United States security.
To fulfill its mission, of course, the NSA needs to be able to decrypt
or "crack" encoded messages. Because there are no restrictions on
the sale and use of encryption domestically, controls on exports rep-
resent the only effective way for the NSA to limit the level of en-
cryption technology that is deployed overseas.99
The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") re-
cently stated that "the potential use of such robust encryption prod-
ucts by a vast array of criminals and terrorists to conceal their criminal
communications and information poses an extremely serious and in
my view unacceptable threat to public safety."'100 Another commenta-
tor warned that uncontrolled cryptography is not only subject to abuse
by foreign masterminds. "If [unbreakable encryption becomes rou-
tine], even the poorest criminals and terrorists in the world would
have automatic extreme privacy for their criminal acts."' 01
Undeniably, there is a societal interest in the public use of encryp-
tion technology to ensure the privacy and integrity of communica-
tion.10 2 Simultaneously, however, the same technology threatens law
enforcement agencies' ability to control drug traffickers, organized
crime, terrorists, and foreign espionage agents.10 3 These conflicting
interests, among others, have given rise to the encryption export con-
trol debate.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Categorizing and Balancing Speech
The government's encryption technology export controls have been
challenged as a violation of the First Amendment freedom of speech.
98. Address by Adm. B. R. Inman, supra note 95, at 200.
99. Altman & McGlone, supra note 94, at 499.
100. The Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era Act of 1996, or Pro-CODE Act,
94th Cong. (1996).
101. Stender, supra note 2, at 324 (citing Steven Levy, The Cypherpunks vs. Uncle Sam, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., June 12, 1994, § 6, reprinted in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 85, at 266,
268).
102. See Lance J. Hoffman, Afterword to BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER, supra note 85, at 549.
103. Id. Interestingly, the ability of strong encryption to threaten security officials' access to
intelligence information is not greatly debated. Froomkin, supra note 5, at 712. The issue de-
bated is to what extent should the government recognize the threat at the expense of, for exam-
ple, the software industry, see Charles L. Evans, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software:
Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in
Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469, 488 (1994), or the rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment.
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The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States de-
clares that: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.'104 This right of free speech, however, is not absolute. 10 5 In
the view of the Supreme Court, "not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance.' 0 6 Through the interpretation of the First
Amendment, the Court established guidelines in determining what
speech is protected. 10 7
As discussed in Part III.A.1, the Supreme Court employs the cate-
gorization method as one means of establishing the First Amendment
protection afforded various expressions. 0 8 This method assigns a cat-
egory to certain types of speech according to high, middle, or low val-
104. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
105. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (4th ed. 1991).
See Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36
(1961):
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association, as protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, are "absolutes," not only in the undoubted sense that
where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that the
scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First
Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two
ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlim-
ited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain
contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. On the
other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech
but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of
law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when
they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prereq-
uisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmen-
tal interest involved.
Id. at 49-51 (citations omitted). But see Justices Black's absolutist approach to free speech in his
dissenting opinion in Konigsberg:
The recognition that [a State] has subjected "speech and association to the deterrence
of subsequent disclosure" is, under the First Amendment, sufficient in itself to render
the action of the State unconstitutional unless one subscribes to the doctrine that per-
mits constitutionally protected rights to be "balanced' away whenever a majority of this
Court thinks that a State might have interest sufficient to justify abridgment of those
freedoms.... I do not subscribe to that doctrine for I believe that the First Amend-
ment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free
speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the
"balancing" that was to be done in this field.
It therefore seems to me that the Court's "absolute" statement that there are no "abso-
lutes" under the First Amendment must be an exaggeration of its own views.
Id. at 60-61, 68 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
106. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (concluding
that matter of public concern is of greater constitutional value than matter of purely private
concern).
107. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 298 (1995).
108. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1071 (12th ed. 1991). See generally Shaman,
supra note 107, at 341 (demonstrating the application of the categorization approach).
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ues.10 9 These values receive a varied degree of judicial scrutiny. High
valued speech is afforded strict scrutiny,"10 middle valued speech is
assigned intermediate scrutiny,"' and low-value speech is deserving of
minimal scrutiny."12
The value placed on speech is also determinative of the Court's bal-
ancing approach, as discussed in Part III.A.2. The Court applies the
ad hoc balancing test to high-value speech,11 3 while definitional bal-
ancing applies to middle valued speech.1 4 Low-value speech is not
worthy of any balancing method.115
1. Categorization
It is difficult to say exactly what characteristics the Court considers
in determining the value of specific speech,116 however, some types
are clear. New York Times v. Sullivan,117 perhaps the most celebrated
First Amendment case ever decided by the Supreme Court," 8 intro-
duced the proposition that political ideas expressed in written form,
even if false, 119 are protected by the First Amendment. 20 Justice
109. See Shaman, supra note 107, at 341.
[T]hrough the technique of categorization ... the Supreme Court designates different
kinds or categories of speech and assigns them high or low value. It can be said that the
Court "categorizes" some kinds of speech as beyond First Amendment protection or at
the fringes of the First Amendment and therefore entitled to little of its protection.
Id.; see id. at 319 (proposing that the Supreme Court has placed some forms of speech in a
middle level of the "constitutional hierarchy").
110. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportu-
nity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the secur-
ity of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.").
111. See infra text accompanying notes 122-24, 143-45.
112. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 500 U.S. 377, 400 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
113. Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 671, 673 (1983).
114. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2-15 to 2-24 (1984).
115. Shaman, supra note 107, at 331.
116. See id. at 298-301.
117. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
118. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1991); Harry Kalven, Jr., The N.Y. Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
119. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 ("Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valua-
ble contribution to public debate."). The Court proposed that inevitable erroneous statements
must be protected to ensure the survival of free speech. Id. at 271-72. In order to promote valid
criticism of public officials, the First Amendment needs "breathing space," thereby allowing a
defense in a suit for libel for "erroneous statements honestly made." Id.
120. In Sullivan, a Commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, claimed he was li-
beled by an advertisement in the New York Times newspaper. Id. at 256. The advertisement
described in detail alleged forceful, egregious police actions. Id. The court conceded that some
of the statements were not entirely accurate, but found that an "erroneous statement is inevita-
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Brennan's majority opinion reminded us that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials."'1 21
Middle-value speech is valued somewhat greater than low-value
speech, but significantly lower than high-value speech. 122 Identifying
an example of middle-value speech is not as clear as high-value polit-
ical speech. The Supreme Court placed commercial speech, for exam-
ple, "at the bottom of a middle level of the constitutional
hierarchy. '' 123 The Supreme Court reasoned that commercial speech
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction.' 1 24
The Court has identified three factors which strongly identify com-
mercial speech when existing in combination: (1) advertisement; (2)
mentioning a specific product by name; and (3) the speech is economi-
cally motivated. 25 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,126 the
combination of all these characteristics provided strong support for
the conclusion that informational pamphlets regarding contraceptives
were commercial speech.' 27
The Supreme Court has noted that consumers and society as a
whole have a great concern for the free flow of commercial informa-
tion.128 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
ble in free debate." Id. at 271. Establishing libel of a public official under Sullivan, the plaintiff
is required to prove: first, the defamatory statement related to the government official claiming
libel, id. at 288; second, the statement must be false, id. at 271; and third, and most importantly,
the plaintiff must provide proof that the defendant made the defamatory statements with "actual
malice," i.e., knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of the statement's
falsity. Id. at 281.
121. Id. at 270; see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365 (1937).
122. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
123. Shaman, supra note 107, at 319 ("While more valuable forms of speech are entitled to the
protection of strict judicial scrutiny, commercial speech receives the protection of intermediate
scrutiny, a step up, of course, from minimal scrutiny, but a significant step down from strict
scrutiny."). Justice Stevens, however, argued some forms of "promotional advertising" should
not be categorized with other commercial speech because the expression may in fact relate to
issues of public significance. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 579-81 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding statute banning electrical utility pro-
motional advertising violates First Amendment). Therefore, argued Stevens, promotional adver-
tising should be entitled to high-value protection. Id.
124. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973) (holding proposals of possible employment, such as the advertisement at issue, are not
protected by the First Amendment).
125. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (finding contraceptive ad
mailings constitute commercial speech).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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sumer Council, Inc.,129 the Court stated that advertising propagates
information that is fundamental to intelligent decision-making about
purchasing goods and services. 130
Categories of speech qualifying as low-value are similarly difficult
to clearly identify. 131 As previously mentioned, the Court theorizes
that some categories of speech have less value than others. This the-
ory, "marked by vacillation and uncertainty,"' 132 creates difficulties in
determining exactly what categories of speech the Court classifies as
low in value. Obscenity has been upheld as low-value speech.
133
Child pornography has also been labeled as low-value. 134 In R.A. V. v.
St. Paul,1 3 5 Justice White's concurring opinion characterized low-value
speech as expressing content "worthless or of de minimis value to
society."'1 36
Categorizing speech as high, middle, or low-value is legally relevant
in that it determines the level of scrutiny applied to the regulation
suppressing such speech.137 High-value speech is subject to strict scru-
tiny under the First Amendment.138 At this level, the regulating body
must establish a compelling state interest that must be achieved by the
least intrusive means.139 As mentioned earlier, political speech is con-
129. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
130. Id. at 765.
131. Shaman, supra note 107, at 299.
At one time or another, the Court has ruled that fighting words, obscenity, and child
pornography are of low value. Some members of the Court, though not quite a major-
ity, would add non-obscene sexually explicit expression to that list. On occasion, a few
members of the Court have expressed doubt about the value of profanity, but profane
speech still clings to a valued position in the minds of a majority of the Court. In the
area of libel, the Court has said that "there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact," and that libelous speech on purely private matters is of less First Amendment
concern.
Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
132. Id.
133. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (denying protection of obscene
materials based on a connection between obscenity and crime and other antisocial conduct);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (proposing a new definition of obscenity as
"lack[ing] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 485-92 (1957) (holding that prohibiting the distribution of obscene materials did not violate
the First Amendment).
134. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1981) ("[T]he value of permitting live perform-
ances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly
modest, if not de minimis.").
135. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
136. Id. at 400 (joined by Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ.).
137. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality By the Supreme
Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236, 242-52 (1983).
138. Id. at 245.
139. Id.
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sidered to be at the core of protected speech.140 Criticism of govern-
ment remains "at the very center of the constitutionally protected
area of free expression.' 14 1 In order for the state to justify prohibiting
such expression of an opinion, "it must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the dis-
comfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint."142
The Court meanwhile applies intermediate scrutiny to middle-value
speech, which does not deserve the highest level of protection yet has
some societal value. 143 Intermediate scrutiny requires the regulation
to be justified by an important governmental interest achieved
through narrowly-tailored means. 144 The means, however, need not
be perfect. 45 As mentioned earlier, commercial speech 146 is one ex-
ample of middle-value speech deserving only intermediate scrutiny. 147
The Constitution protects commercial speech to a lesser degree than
strict scrutiny, but more than minimal.1 48
Low-value speech is afforded only minimal scrutiny. 149 Minimal
scrutiny requires that the regulating body establish a "valid or legiti-
140. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964); see supra notes 112-17.
141. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), where students wore black armbands to oppose the Vietnam War. Id.
at 514. Not only was this form of speech "closely akin to 'pure speech,"' id. at 505, but it was in
opposition to the government's involvement in the Vietnam War. Id. at 510. Thus, the regula-
tion was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 513. The Court did not expressly use the term "compel-
ling" to explain the burden of proof, but required the government to establish that the conduct
"materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school." Id. The State in this case could not meet its burden of proof where the
record was void of evidence establishing anticipated substantial disruption or of material inter-
ference with academic activities and where no disruptions or interferences in fact occurred. Id.
at 514.
142. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
143. Shaman, supra note 107, at 329.
144. Id.
145. Id. (citing Shaman, supra note 137, at 242-52).
146. Commercial speech is defined as proposing a commercial transaction. NOWAK & Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 105, at 1011. Commercial speech was not always afforded protection. "Until
relatively recently the Court has simply excluded all commercial speech, even truthful advertis-
ing, from the coverage of the First Amendment." Id. Today, commercial speech is vested with
First Amendment protection, but not as extensive as political speech. "The state can issue rea-
sonable time, place, or manner regulations of commercial speech .... In addition, the state has a
broader power to regulate misleading commercial speech than its power to regulate misleading
or libelous speech about public officials or public figures." Id.
147. See Shaman, supra note 107, at 329; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (determining commercial speech is expression protected
by the First Amendment but noting there is a "commonsense" difference between traditionally
protected speech and commercial speech).
148. Shaman, supra note 107, at 319, 329; see Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562.
149. Shaman, supra note 107, at 330.
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mate state interest achieved through reasonable means."'150 This level
of scrutiny grants tremendous deference to the state in its decision-
making power and thus is effectively no scrutiny at all. 151 Occasion-
ally, however, the Court will strike down a "low-value speech" regula-
tion by applying minimal scrutiny with "bite."'1 52
A common criticism of the categorization method is the tendency of
speech to cross categories. 153 "[T]he categories of speech designated
by the Supreme Court, like most other categories, cannot be neatly
separated. They tend to overlap one another, making it problematic
to assess the value of speech."'1 54 For example, an obscene statement
is afforded minimal protection,155 but an obscene comment critical of
the government presumably would deserve intermediate, if not strict,
scrutiny. On the other hand, an obscene comment critical of the gov-
ernment causing physical harm to another person or group of persons
would likely be struck down because of the harm it caused. 156 Nota-
bly, however, "a certain amount of categorizing is unavoidable in con-
stitutional decision-making, or, for that matter, in any other form of
human decision-making."'1 57
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels
of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 166-68 (1984).
153. See Shaman, supra note 107, at 344-45 (proposing categories of speech tend to overlap
and thus confuse the value attributed to such expression).
154. Id. at 345; see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (concluding publicly displaying a
jacket with words "Fuck the Draft" is speech protected by the First Amendment, thereby appar-
ently categorizing "Fuck the Draft" as both political speech and profanity); see also Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-52 (1988) (demonstrating difficulty in categorizing an unde-
niably gross and offensive parody that also skewers political and religious hypocrisy).
155. Shaman, supra note 107, at 308 ("Obscene speech ... remains at the bottom of the totem
pole, having, as the Court sees it, no value and therefore no protection under the First Amend-
ment."); see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (demonstrating obscene speech is
worthy of minimal First Amendment protection).
156. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (holding the distribution of
obscene materials to be prohibited because obscenities were somehow connected to crime and
other anti-social behavior). In 1978, the Supreme Court demonstrated an example of such classi-
fication cross-over. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S 447, 459 (1978) (uphold-
ing a lawyer solicitation regulation in a commercial environment) with In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 433-39 (1978) (striking down a lawyer solicitation regulation in a political environment).
157. Shaman, supra note 107, at 342; see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
[T]he low value theory, or some variant thereof, is an essential concomitant of an effec-
tive system of free expression, for unless we are prepared to apply the same standards
to private blackmail, for example, that we apply to public political debate, some distinc-
tions in terms of constitutional value are inevitable.
Id. at 252 n.24; see Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
605 ("[It would be difficult to imagine a sensible system of free expression that did not distin-
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2. Balancing
In addition to levels of scrutiny, the Court applies various balancing
approaches to categories of speech. High-value speech is subject to an
ad hoc balancing approach where the Court focuses upon each partic-
ular case individually and weighs the interest served by the speech in
each particular instance against the asserted state interest in regulat-
ing the speech.158 As mentioned earlier, no speech is absolutely pro-
tected.159 The ad hoc balancing test, however, tends to be highly
protective of high-value speech.160 "[The ad hoc balancing test] al-
low[s] speech to be regulated only upon a showing that the particular
speech in question will cause a serious harm that cannot be avoided by
an alternative, less restrictive regulation.' 16 1 Notably, if the govern-
ment has a compelling state interest in preventing serious harm
caused by highly valued speech, a regulation of such speech may be
constitutional. 62 Therefore, even political speech, the most valued
kind of speech, may be regulated if it is demonstrated to cause serious
harm, or if a compelling state interest is shown to support its
regulation. 163
Ad hoc balancing applies to high-value speech. Lower valued
speech, though not the least valued speech, is subject to definitional
balancing. 164 The definitional balancing approach does not require
the Court to find that the speech in a particular case is harmful. 165
The Court must simply determine that the category of speech "tends
to cause harm. ' 166 Therefore, when applying definitional balancing,
the Court will uphold a regulation of speech if the Court is convinced
guish among categories of speech in accordance with their importance to the underlying pur-
poses of the free speech guarantee.").
158. Schlag, supra note 113, at 673.
159. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
160. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), where a leader of a Ku Klux Klan
("KKK") group challenged his conviction under an Ohio statute which punished advocates of
violent means when attempting to achieve political and economic change. Id. at 444-45. The
appellant discussed the KKK's plan to march on Congress during a televised broadcast of his
presentation at the rally. Id. at 445. The Court held advocacy of violence protected by the First
Amendment as long as the advocacy did not incite people to imminent action. Id. at 447. "[The
state may not] forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action." Id. (footnote omitted).
161. Shaman, supra note 107, at 330-31.
162. Id. at 331.
163. Id.
164. NIMMER, supra note 114, §§ 2-15 to 2-24.
165. Shaman, supra note 107, at 331.
166. Id.
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that the class of speech in question is sufficiently harmful, even with-
out a showing of actual harm.167
Speech that the Court finds lowest in value, such as obscenity, is
denied definitional balancing. 168 Professor Jeffrey Shaman described
the Supreme Court's approach to speech lowest in value:
[B]ecause the Court sees the speech as having little or no value, the
Court designates it as a category of speech that receives no First
Amendment protection. In effect, the Court "categorizes out" cer-
tain kinds of speech to deny them First Amendment protection.
This use of the categorization technique requires no showing of any
harm, whether of the particular speech or of the class of speech. All
the Court looks to is the value of the speech, and if the Court is
convinced that the speech has no value, the Court gives no constitu-
tional protection to the speech. 169
Summarizing these tests, courts apply the balancing approach to de-
termine the constitutionality of a regulation based on an evaluation of
the harm caused by the speech. Courts apply the categorization ap-
proach to determine an expression's constitutionality through value
assessment.
B. Pure Speech Versus Expressive Conduct
The Supreme Court applies the classification and balancing tech-
niques in resolving a First Amendment protection issue. Additionally,
the Court assesses labels to various forms of speech. The purest forms
of speech are the printed page and the spoken word.170 However,
even speech not in the precise form of written or verbal words, or
expressive conduct, is granted First Amendment protection as it is
"closely akin to 'pure speech.""71 For example, in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,72 the Court pro-
tected the wearing of black armbands by school children in opposition
to the Vietnam War.173
Additionally, some types of expressive conduct, although not pure
speech or "closely akin to pure speech"' 74 receive constitutional pro-
167. Id. at 331-32.
168. Id. at 331.
169. Id. at 331-32.
170. See Shaman, supra note 107, at 304.
171. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) ("[W]e do
not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four
corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.").
172. Id. at 514.
173. Id.
174. See supra text accompanying note 171.
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tection. 175 Not all expressive conduct, however, is per se protected
speech. The Court in United States v. O'Brien176 explicitly stated: "We
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea.''1 77
Another labeling issue arises where speech is not purely expressive,
but also contains non-speech elements. If the Court determines a reg-
ulation suppresses expressive conduct where both speech and non-
speech elements are present, the Court must examine which element
the government intended to regulate. 178 The O'Brien Court held that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the 'nonspeech' element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms. ' 179 The extent to which the govern-
mental interest must be established depends on the value the Court
gives to the speech at issue.180 After all, "not all speech is of equal
First Amendment importance.' 18'
C. Content-Based or Content-Neutral
After a court categorizes the type of speech and determines the ap-
plicable test, it must then focus on the government's conduct. Where
the government attempts to regulate conduct, courts first consider
whether the regulation discriminates based on the content of pro-
tected speech. Viewpoint discrimination and subject-matter discrimi-
175. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), the Court found that a statute criminaliz-
ing the display of a red flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized govern-
ment" without proof of likelihood to incite violence, was unconstitutional as a violation of
freedom of speech. Id. at 369-70. Thus, the Court demonstrated that speech does not need to be
in the form of words to be protected by the First Amendment. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 405 (1989) (holding the burning of the American flag to be expressive conduct). In Johnson,
a demonstrator burned the American flag to protest the government in a political demonstra-
tion. Id. at 399. The Court held the burning of the American flag to be expressive conduct. Id.
at 405. The Court recognized that First Amendment protection applied to "speech" other than
the written or spoken word. Id. at 404. By no means did the Court intend to find that any
conduct is protected speech as long as the actor intends to convey a message. Id. at 405. The
Court noted the American flag, like many other flags, possesses an inherent message. Id. ("The
very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say, 'the
one visible manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood."') (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 603 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
176. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
177. Id. at 376.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 376-77.
181. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985); see supra
notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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nation are two forms of content-based regulations. 182 If a regulation is
based on a particular viewpoint 183 or subject matter, 184 the Court ap-
plies strict scrutiny.' 85 According to Justice Marshall, "[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.' 86 Format discrimination, meanwhile, is a content-
neutral regulation that warrants a less strict level of scrutiny. 187 Pro-
182. See GUNTHER, supra note 108, at 1214-17. We must remember that although content-
based regulations are not permitted, it is often necessary to review the content of the speech to
determine whether or not the speech is protected by the First Amendment. See Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) (noting even protected speech may or may not be
regulated depending on the content of the speech); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964) (recognizing that a public official may recover damages for libel if it can be proven
the critic wrote with actual malice). One may reasonably assume that if the content had been
referring to a private citizen, thus altering the subject matter, the burden of proof would be
lessened. These cases do not belie the general principle prohibiting content-based regulation.
The purpose of the principle is to ensure government neutrality in its regulation. See Turner
Broad. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("The principle inquiry in determining content neutral-
ity... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or]
disagreement with the message it conveys.") (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989)). The regulation may not be influenced by personal sympathy or hostility for the
message of the speaker, writer, actor, or any other form of communicator. Young, 427 U.S. at 68
("Thus, although the content of story must be examined to decide whether it involves a public
figure or a public issue, the Court's application of the relevant rule may not depend on its
favorable or unfavorable appraisal of that figure or that issue.").
183. For example, a regulation that permits Democrats to speak, but not Republicans, or a
regulation that allows presentations by pro-choice activists, but not pro-life activists.
184. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1980) (striking down state law barring
picketing of residences or dwellings, but permitting peaceful picketing of a place of employment
involved in a labor dispute); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-94 & n.2 (1972) (finding
unconstitutional ordinance which barred picketing within 150 feet of a school, but exempted
"peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute").
185. GUNTHER, supra note 108, at 1214. Professor Geoffrey Stone, one of the leading defend-
ers of the distinction between the levels of scrutiny afforded content-based versus content-neu-
tral regulations, explains the justification for a higher level of scrutiny afforded viewpoint
discrimination:
Any law that substantially prevents the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint,
or item of information violates the [F]irst [A]mendment except, perhaps, in the most
extraordinary of circumstances. This is so, not because such a law restricts "a lot" of
speech, but because by effectively excising a specific message from public debate, it
mutilates "the thinking process of the community" and is thus incompatible with the
central precepts of-the [F]irst [A]mendment.
Stone, supra note 157, at 198 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27
(1960)).
186. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (citations omitted).
187. GUNTHER, supra note 108, at 1214; see Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984) (holding an ordinance prohibiting posting signs on public prop-
erty constitutional); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) (prohibiting all
adult films in a particular area). In Taxpayers for Vincent, Justice Stevens's majority opinion
classified the ordinance as content-neutral. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-07.
The ordinance prohibits appellees from communicating with the public in a certain
manner, and presumably diminishes the total quantity of their communication in the
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fessor Gerald Gunther opines that although format discriminations do
not involve viewpoint or subject matter discrimination, they do afford
special treatment to expressions protected by the First Amendment:
A total ban on a particular format may in fact have a major effect
on the quantity of communication. Moreover, it may in fact dis-
criminate against those groups who are financially unable to resort
to the more conventional (and more expensive) means of communi-
cation, such as newspapers and the broadcasting media.188
The Court today, however, typically upholds a majority of format-
based regulations. 189 "[C]ontent-based restrictions are very strictly
scrutinized; content-neutral distinctions elicit a scrutiny less strict." 90
D. The O'Brien Test
In an attempt to constitutionally challenge the government's regula-
tion of exporting encryption technology as a suppression of expressive
conduct, courts have applied the O'Brien test. In United States v.
O'Brien,191 the defendant was convicted for violating a statute that
prohibited knowingly destroying or mutilating certificates such as re-
gistration certificates for the Selective Service. 192 Reviewing the stat-
ute, the Court found that O'Brien's certificate burning was expressive
conduct where he intended to express his beliefs and influence the
public.193 He knew burning the certificate was a violation of federal
law and others would understand the certificate burning was in oppo-
sition to the war. 194 The regulation, however, was content-neutral as
it attempted to prohibit knowing destruction of certificates issued by
the Selective Service System. 195 O'Brien was convicted for deliber-
ately destroying his registration certificate, thus willfully frustrating
City.... [But it] has been clear since this Court's earliest decisions ... [that] the state
may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate
state interest. . . . [The] First Amendment forbids the government from regulating
speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others .... That
general rule has no application to this case. For there is not even a hint of bias or
censorship in the City's enactment or enforcement of this ordinance.
Id. at 803-04. The Court's review required a showing that the statute promoted an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and the "'incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest."' Id. at 804-05 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
188. GUNTHER, supra note 108, at 1217.
189. Id.; see, e.g., Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817.
190. GUNTHER, supra note 108, at 1214.
191. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
192. Id. at 370.
193. See id. at 376.
194. Id. at 369-70.
195. Id. at 375.
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the governmental interest of "preventing harm to the smooth and effi-
cient functioning of the Selective Service System."'1 96 The Court ex-
plicitly stated: "For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and
for nothing else, he was convicted."'1 97
The Court applied a four-part test to determine the constitutionality
of a content-neutral regulation 198 that attempted to suppress con-
duct199 with speech and non-speech elements:200 (1) the government
must have the authority to regulate this activity; (2) the regulation
must further an important or substantial governmental interest;20' (3)
the purpose must be unrelated to regulating free speech; and (4) the
regulation must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. '202 The Court applied this test to the government regu-
lation and upheld the defendant's conviction.20 3 First, the Court
found the government had the authority to regulate this activity.2°4
Second, the Court expressly held that the regulation of burning of cer-
tificates such as the draft cards furthered the government's substantial
and legitimate interest in keeping track of the draft cards in a time of
war.2 0 5 Third, the government's purpose was found to be unrelated to
regulating free speech, as the government wanted to ensure that peo-
ple had their draft cards for tracking purposes. 206 Finally, the Court
found that the regulation clearly protected this stated substantial gov-
ernmental interest.2 07 Furthermore, there were no alternative means
that would be more narrowly tailored to achieve the government's
purpose of protecting the availability of the certificates.20 8 Notably,
the Court stated that even if there had been an identified communica-
196. Id. at 382.
197. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. But see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931)
(finding statute prohibiting the display of any "flag, badge, banner, or device" as a means of
expressing opposition to organized government unconstitutional as the statute was aimed at sup-
pressing communication).
198. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (proposing that if the governmental interest is really aimed
at the speech or expression, the Court must apply strict scrutiny).
199. Id. (describing the process of determining conduct as expressive when the communicator
intended to convey a particularized message and presumably the message would be understood
by those who viewed it).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 377 (holding that the O'Brien test applies intermediate scrutiny to regulation aimed
at expressive conduct as long as the intent is not to suppress the speech).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
205. Id. at 377-81.
206. Id. at 378-82.
207. Id. at 381.
208. Id. The Court concluded that the defendant was convicted for his conduct and not for
any communicative impact his conduct may have provided. Id. at 382.
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tive element in the defendant's conduct, this alone would not place
the conduct under protection of the First Amendment: "[Wihen
'speech' and 'non-speech' elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulat-
ing the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." 20 9
In Texas v. Johnson,210 the Court applied the O'Brien test to a stat-
ute criminalizing the intentional or knowing desecration of venerated
objects.211 The Court asserted that burning the American flag was
expressive conduct that others could understand as a message that the
defendant was intending to convey.212 Unlike O'Brien, the Court
found that the government was attempting to regulate the speech as
opposed to the conduct.213 A regulation attempting to protect the
positive message conveyed by the flag is content-based and therefore
subject to strict scrutiny. 21 4 "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offen-
sive or disagreeable. '215 Hence, the restriction of a message based on
its content takes a regulation out of the realm of the O'Brien test and
strict scrutiny applies.216
209. Id.
210. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
211. Id. at 400. The defendant, Gregory Lee Johnson, participated in a demonstration pro-
testing the Reagan Administration's policies on nuclear weapons. Id. at 399. In front of Dallas
City Hall, Johnson bathed the American Flag in kerosene and ignited the flag, submerging it in a
bed of flames. Id. As the flag burned, fellow protesters chanted anti-America poetry. Id. Sev-
eral witnesses testified that Johnson's flag burning demonstration was personally offensive. Id.
No one was physically injured or threatened with such injury. Id. Johnson was charged with
desecrating a venerated object in violation of the Texas statute. Id. at 400. He was convicted for
desecrating the flag and not for the insulting words he chanted. Id. at 402.
212. Id. at 411.
If [the defendant] had burned the flag as a means of disposing of it because it was dirty
or torn, he would not have been convicted of flag desecration under this Texas law:
federal law designates burning as the preferred means of disposing of a flag "when it is
in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display."
Id. (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 412.
214. Id. ("[The defendant] was not ... prosecuted for the expression of just any idea; he was
prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situ-
ated at the core of our First Amendment values.") (footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 414.
216. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412. The Court cited Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988), for the
proposition that the State's interest in preserving the "special symbolic character of the flag"
subjects the Texas statute to strict scrutiny. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412.
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E. Prior Restraints and the First Amendment
As previously mentioned, the Court applies a variety of tests to de-
termine if and how much constitutional protection is afforded an al-
leged expression. The Supreme Court applies additional tests to
regulations functioning as a prior restraint on speech. "[I1t has been
generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of
the [First Amendment's free press] guaranty to prevent previous re-
straints upon publication. '217 The proprietary status afforded publica-
tion justifies the Court's presumption of unconstitutionality when
faced with a prior restraint. "Any prior restraint on expression comes
to [the] Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional
validity.121 8 While prior restraints have often applied to publica-
tions,21 9 they are also recognized in licensing schemes.220 Notably,
however, the Court has consistently rejected the idea that a prior re-
straint can never be employed.221
The government's encryption export regulation has been challenged
as an unconstitutional licensing scheme. When licensing schemes
function as a prior restraint on speech, Freedman v. Maryland22 2 and
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.22 3 provide reviewing
guidelines.
In Freedman, the state enacted a statute requiring submission of all
motion pictures to the censorship board prior to exhibition.22 4 The
appellant was convicted for failing to submit a movie to the board
prior to its showing.22 5 He argued that the licensing scheme was an
unconstitutional prior restraint, since the statute did not provide a
time limit for judicial review and the statutory procedure effectively
barred exhibition without a time consuming appeal for reversal of the
review board's decision.22 6 The Court found that the state procedural
217. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S 697, 713 (1931). In Near, a Minnesota statute forbade pro-
ducing and publishing "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" periodicals. Id. at 701-02. Such
an injunction was found unconstitutional as a prior restraint on speech. Id. at 723. "Near v.
Minnesota . . . is the most frequently cited case symbolizing the special suspicion of prior re-
straint." GUNTHER, supra note 108, at 1203 n.3.
218. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citations omitted).
219. See e.g., CBS v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
220. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc., v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988).
221. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
222. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
223. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
224. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 52.
225. Id. at 53.
226. Id. at 54-55.
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scheme constituted an invalid prior restraint.22 7 Some cases applying
the Freedman standards interpret the Court's opinion to hold that for
a licensing scheme to be constitutional: (1) the licensor must make the
licensing decision within a specific and reasonable period of time; (2)
there must be prompt judicial review; and (3) the censor bears the
burdens of going to court to uphold a licensing denial and justifying
the denial.228
In Lakewood, the Court did not apply the Freedman factors. In-
stead, the Court found that in order to strike down a licensing scheme
by a prior restraint facial challenge, the scheme must give "a govern-
ment official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the
content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or
disliked speakers. ' 229 In order to facially attack a licensing scheme,
the licensing law "must have a close enough nexus to expression, or to
conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and sub-
stantial threat of the identified censorship risks. '230 The mere fact
that regulated conduct possibly can be expressive is not enough to
invalidate a law on its face on prior restraint grounds.231 Further-
more, a licensing scheme must be directed "narrowly and specifically
at expression or conduct commonly associated with expression. '232
227. Id. at 58-60. In its opinion, the Court identified several constitutionally mandated
safeguards:
First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the
censor .... [Second, the licensing scheme] cannot be administered in a manner which
would lend an effect of finality to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes
protected expression .... [Because] only a judicial determination in a adversary pro-
ceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. To this end,
the exhibitor must be assured ... that the censor will, within a specified brief period,
either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. Any restraint imposed
in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judi-
cial resolution.
Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
228. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990).
229. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988).
230. Id.
231. See Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 303 (9th Cir. 1996) (proposing that laws
prohibiting sitting on city sidewalks are not subject to facial challenge even though sitting on city
sidewalks may occasionally be expressive).
232. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760-61 (reasoning that "laws of general application that are not
aimed at conduct commonly associated with ...expression carry with them little danger of
censorship").
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ENCRYPTION
EXPORT REGULATIONS
2 3 3
A. Karn v. United States Department of State
In 1994, Karn brought the first case challenging the constitutional
validity of government encryption regulations.2 34 He submitted a
commodity jurisdiction request 235 to the State Department for the
book Applied Cryptography, by Bruce Schneier.236 The Office of De-
fense Trade Controls ("ODTC") determined that the book itself was
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of State under the
ITAR.2 37 The two diskettes referred to in the book, however, con-
tained encryption source code and therefore were potentially subject
to the licensing jurisdiction of the Department of State.238 Therefore,
on March 9, 1994, Karn submitted a commodity jurisdiction request
for a diskette containing the encryption source code referred to in the
government's response to Karn's first submission.2 39 The ODTC
found the diskette subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of
State pursuant to the ITAR and the AECA as a defense article on the
United States Munitions List.2 40 Karn's appeal was denied and the
source code diskette was confirmed as a defense article on the Muni-
tions List.241 In response, Karn filed a complaint with the District
Court of the District of Columbia.242
The district court granted the government's summary judgment mo-
tion, holding that the -government properly designated cryptographic
233. The Export Regulations have come under Congressional attack as well as constitutional
challenges. For example, a number of bills have come before Congress proposing the relaxation
of export controls on encryption exportation. See Showdown on Encryption, WASH. POST, May
25, 1997, at C6. "While congressional efforts appear to be motivated mostly by financial or
international trade concerns, court challenges find their predicate on constitutional grounds."
Stender, supra note 2, at 308-09. For an outline of the pending proposals before Congress, see
id. at 309. This Comment focuses on the constitutional challenges to encryption licensing
controls.
234. Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
235. See supra note 79 for a description of the commodity jurisdiction request process.
236. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 3-4.
240. Id. at 4.
241. Id.
242. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 4.
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software on the list of defense articles.243 The court denied judicial
review of the issue.244
The district court then addressed the government's request for judg-
ment as a matter of law on Karn's First Amendment claim.245 Karn
contended that the diskette2 46 was "speech" protected by the First
Amendment, because the source code contained human readable
"comments" which are ignored by the computer.247 The court ac-
cepted this claim.248
The court found the government regulation content-neutral. 249 The
governmental interest in regulating the encryption software was not
targeted to either the expressive content of the comments or the
source code.250 Rather, the government desired to decrease foreign
intelligence ability to encode communications. 251 Karn, therefore,
had the burden of proving bad faith or motive of the government, but
he did not satisfy this burden.252 The government satisfied the ele-
ments of the O'Brien test. The government had the authority to con-
trol the export of defense articles, the export regulation furthered an
important governmental interest of preventing the "proliferation of
cryptographic products," and the regulation was "'no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." 253
The parties agreed that the first two requirements of the test were
met.254 Karn argued that the last requirement had not been satisfied,
pointing to the fact that the cryptographic algorithms were already
243. Id.
244. Id. at 9-14 (suggesting that the regulation was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to
further the significant government interest of controlling the proliferation of cryptographic
products).
245. Id. at 9. Karn also stated a claim for violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, id. at 3,
however, the Fifth Amendment analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment.
246. The Karn court chose not to address the book's classification because the government
only prohibited the export of the diskette. Id. at 9. Moreover, Karn did not question the book's
classification before the court. Id.
247. Id. at 9-10.
248. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 9-10. Notably, the court stated that it was not ruling as to whether
the source code without comments is protected speech. Id. at 10. More importantly, the court
did admit that source codes are "merely a means of commanding a computer to perform a func-
tion." Id. at 9 n.19.
249. Id. at 10; see supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
250. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10.
251. Id. The government claimed, "the proliferation of [cryptographic hardware and
software] will make it easier for foreign intelligence targets to deny the United States Govern-
ment access to information vital to national security interests." Id. at 11.
252. Id. at 10-11.
253. Id. at 11 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
254. Id.
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available abroad at the time he requested a license jurisdiction.2 55 In
addition, the algorithms on the diskette at issue were so weak that the
National Security Agency could break the codes.2 56 The court re-
jected this argument, noting that the President placed cryptographic
products on the ITAR to protect the United States from the potential
harm caused by the proliferation of cryptographic products.2 57 The
court refused to judge this foreign policy decision.2 58 The court also
refused to review the harms created by the regulation and the injury
to national security under the ad hoc balancing test of Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District:2 59 "[S]uch a test in
the case at bar would require the Court to scrutinize the actual injury
to national security. '2 60
Interestingly, in Karn, there was no finding with respect to the
"functionality" of the Karn diskette as a cryptographic device.2 61 The
court, however, acknowledged that the government's policy decision
that "the proliferation of this type of product is harmful to the na-
tional security" was persuasive enough to uphold the regulation of the
software. 262
Finally, the Karn court found that the plaintiff did not present any
support for the argument that the regulation was "'substantially
255. Id. The court disagreed with Karn's contention that the third prong was in dispute. Id.
Karn actually addressed the second prong, as the argument questioned whether the government
had a legitimate interest at stake. Id.
256. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11.
257. Id.
258. Id. ("[The President's] policy judgment exists despite the availability of cryptographic
software through the Internet and the National Security Agency's alleged ability to break certain
codes. Even if this were a factual dispute, it is not one into which this Court can or will delve.").
The court supported this conclusion by citing the Supreme Court in Chicago & Southern Air
Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (proposing that the President's
foreign policy decisions are the responsibility of the Executive branch and that the Judiciary has
"neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility"). Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11.
259. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
260. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 12; see United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990)
("[W]hether the export of a given commodity would make a significant contribution to the mili-
tary potential of other countries ... is a political question not subject to review to determine
whether [it] had a basis in fact."); United States v. Martinez, 904 F.2d 601, 602 (11th Cir. 1990)
("The question whether a particular item should have been placed on the Munitions List pos-
sesses nearly every trait that the Supreme Court has enumerated traditionally renders a question
'political."').
261, Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 12. In Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 974 F. Supp.
1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997), the government argued that the export of encryption software and other
encryption products must be controlled because of its functional capacity, rather than any infor-
mational value the software provides. Id. at 1305; see supra text accompanying note 72 (propos-
ing that the government's purpose is to control software because of its functionality, not because
of its possible expression).
262.* Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 12.
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broader than necessary"' to achieve the government's stated objec-
tive.263 Furthermore, Karn did not provide any proof of current barri-
ers to distributing the information relating to cryptography by any
available alternative means other than the export of encryption source
code on machine-readable media.264
B. Bernstein v. United States Department of State
Less than one month after the Karn court decided and filed its opin-
ion holding source code was constitutionally regulated, the Northern
District of California found source code constituted protected
speech.265 Six months later on cross-motions for summary judgment,
Judge Patel held that the government licensing scheme created an un-
lawful prior restraint on speech.266 In 1997, Bernstein filed an
amended complaint in response to an executive order transferring ju-
risdiction over commercial encryption exports from the State Depart-
ment to the Commerce Department. 267 The court in this most recent
decision held that Bernstein failed to establish a statutory challenge to
the executive order, that the government regulations remained subject
to a prior restraint analysis, and that the licensing scheme imposed on
263. Id. (citing Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984)).
264. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
265. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter
Bernstein 1]. In his first complaint, Bernstein sought declaratory and injunctive relief from en-
forcement of the AECA and ITAR. Id. at 1428. The district court found that source code was
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1436. The court made no final judgment on the mer-
its, but did find that the plaintiffs presented a colorable and justiciable constitutional challenge.
Id. at 1439. As the Karn court considered the regulating issue as the government's interest in
protecting national security and Bernstein viewed the issue as one of speech suppression, Bern-
stein I became the first opinion recognizing computer code as protected speech. See Thinh
Nguyen, Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment, in Bernstein v. United States
Department of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 667, 672 (1997). "[T]he issue was transformed
from the realm of the government's interest in controlling the export of material deemed harm-
ful to national security, or a 'political question' in Karn, to the right to speak cryptographically in
Bernstein." Stender, supra note 2, at 315.
266. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [here-
inafter Bernstein II]. In Bernstein II, the court found parts of the scheme unconstitutionally
vague while upholding other parts as constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 1292-95. The court con-
cluded that the ITAR licensing requirements for encryption software constituted an unlawful
prior restraint. Id. at 1290. The government argued that the restraint was a justified means of
ensuring national security. Id. at 1288. The court found that the national security reasoning
alone did not justify the restraint. Id. ("[N]ational security, without more, [is] too amorphous a
rationale to abrogate the protections of the First Amendment.") (citing New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971)).
267. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [here-
inafter Bernstein].
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encryption software acted as an unconstitutional prior restraint of pro-
tected speech.2 68
Professor Bernstein developed an encryption algorithm while he
was a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley. 69
He articulated the algorithm in an academic paper both in English and
in "source code" high-level computer programming language.270 In
1992, Bernstein submitted to the State Department 271 a commodity
jurisdiction request 272 with regard to his "Snuffle" encryption al-
gorithm.273 The State Department informed Bernstein that "Snuffle"
was a defense article under the ITAR and could not be exported with-
out a State Department license.2 74 Bernstein filed suit, claiming the
AECA and the ITAR restricted his ability to teach, publish or discuss
his theories on cryptography as referred to in his program. Bernstein
argued that the licensing requirements constituted a prior restraint on
his right to free speech in violation of the First Amendment.275
On August 25, 1997, the court agreed with Bernstein, finding the
regulations presented "a danger of unduly suppressing protected ex-
pression. 2 76 The court reasoned that "[w]hile defendants may have
the authority to regulate encryption source code, they must nonethe-
less do so within the bounds of the First Amendment. '277 The
Supreme Court requires a presumption against the constitutional va-
lidity of prior restraints.278 The government, according to the Bern-
stein court, failed to rebut the presumption.2 79
268. Id. at 1300-09. The government appealed the final Bernstein ruling. Does Constitution
Protect Software as Free Speech? Federal Court Rejects Argument in Challenge of U.S. Regula-
tions, STAR-TRIB., Aug. 2, 1998, at 6D, available in 1998 WL 6362983 [hereinafter Does Constitu-
tion Protect]. The parties argued before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and are now
awaiting decision. Id.
269. Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1428-29.
270. Id. at 1429. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of source code.
271. This submission, in 1993, occurred when the State Department still had jurisdiction over
commercial encryption exports, and such exports were governed by the ITAR. Bernstein, 974 F.
Supp. at 1288. See supra notes 68-71 for a discussion of the transfer of control from the State
Department to the Commerce Department.
272. See supra note 79 for a description of the commodity jurisdiction request process.
273. Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1430. "Snuffle" is the name Bernstein chose to call his pro-
gram. Id.
274. Id.
275. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1293. Bernstein also argued that various terms make the regu-
lation vague and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 1296. Furthermore, he
complained that the regulations violated his freedom of association. Id. These complaints will
not be addressed in this Comment.
276. Id. at 1306 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 54 (1965)).
277. Id. at 1303.
278. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); see supra notes 217-
18 and accompanying text.
279. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1308.
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The court found that the encryption regulations were directed to
"an entire field of applied scientific research and discourse. ' 280 It rea-
soned that cryptographic software may be exported subject to the reg-
ulation for non-expressive reasons. 281 Scientists, however, may in fact
develop and use cryptographic software programs for expressive rea-
sons while remaining subject to the licensing requirements.2 82 With
this, the court argued, the regulation acted as a prior restraint sup-
pressing constitutionally protected expression.2 83
The court also found the exception for printed materials "irrational
and administratively unreliable. ' 284 The court cited Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union2 85 for the proposition that electronic media and
print media should be reviewed under the same degree of strict scru-
tiny.286 Therefore, the government could not rationally treat materials
with varying levels of review simply because they were carried by dif-
ferent mediums. 287
With regard to the government's national security concerns, the
court determined these alone were not enough to justify a prior re-
straint on speech.2 88 The court, citing Justice Brennan in New York
Times Co. v. United States,289 concluded that prior restraints under the
First Amendment could only be upheld during a time of war.2 90 Such
restraints must prevent "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to
our Nation or its people. ' 291 According to Bernstein, the President
and the BXA justified the regulation as protecting interests of na-
280. Id. at 1305.
281. Id.
282. Id. (demonstrating expressive activities such as teaching, publishing, speaking, or In-
ternet communications).
283. Id. at 1308.
284. Id. at 1306 (noting that the regulations allow for the international export of written
materials in a book without a license, yet the same information on a disk and exporting it inter-
nationally is subject to the export regulations' licensing requirements).
285. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) (suggesting that distinguishing between written and elec-
tronic media is unjustified and that the Internet is subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as
print media).
286. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1306-07. The court also noted that distinguishing between
written and electronic transmission is dangerous in an age where many professional journals are
converted to electronic form onto the Internet. Id. at 1306.
287. Id. at 1307.
288. Id.
289. 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919)).
290. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1307.
291. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., & White, J., concurring).
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tional security and foreign policy.292 These interests, according to the
court, were insufficient to justify a prior restraint on speech.293
The Bernstein court also noted that a regulation did not have to be
aimed at the content to be a prior restraint on speech.294 The fact that
the regulation was directed at "expressive activity" was sufficient to
apply the prior restraint test.295 Thus, the court held that even a li-
censing regulation with a content-neutral purpose must adequately
provide constitutional procedural safeguards. 296 According to Bern-
stein, the adequacy of the safeguards are then reviewed by the Freed-
man test.297
Applying the Freedman test, the court concluded that the licensing
scheme was unconstitutional. 298 First, the court found that the licens-
ing scheme did not provide for a specific time period within which
applications would be decided. 299 The scheme does not restrict the
time for the government to make a licensing decision.300 The only
time restriction applied to the appeal process, and this restriction
vaguely required that an appeal be made within a reasonable time.
30 1
Second, the court held the licensing scheme prohibited judicial review
of the agency's appellate decision. 30 2 Finally, the government had not
stipulated to any standards for deciding an application. 30 3 The gov-
ernment's proposed case-by-case analysis, arguably without any limits,
did not satisfy the third requirement in Freedman: "[Tlhe censor must
bear the burden of going to court to uphold a licensing denial and
once there bears the burden of justifying the denial. 30 4
In sum, the district court agreed with the plaintiff that a computer
program consists of more than a process to operate a computer, and
truly forms a medium for the expression of ideas.30 5 Furthermore, the
292. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1307.
293. Id. Notably, the court conceded that it remains unclear what the Supreme Court stan-
dard is for finding justification of a prior restraint. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1307.
299. Id. at 1308. See supra notes 78-84 for a discussion of the licensing application process
and procedures.
300. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1308.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1305 ("[Tlhe court does not disagree that encryption software is highly functional,
but functionality does not remove it from the realm of speech. Just because an idea is functional
does not 'negate' its expressiveness. Indeed, it is functional speech.").
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court found that the encryption regulation did not provide adequate
procedural safeguards. 30 6 Therefore, the Bernstein court ruled that
the government regulation violated the First Amendment as a prior
restraint on speech.30 7
Contrary to Karn, the Bernstein court applied the Freedman prior
restraint test to the governmental regulation of encryption
software.308 The court did not find that defining the regulation as con-
tent-based or content-neutral was necessary. The court simply held
that the government regulation unconstitutionally restrained pro-
tected speech.309
V. ANALYSIS
A. Is Cryptographic Software Speech?
In Bernstein I, the court held that computer software was pure
speech protected by the First Amendment. 310 This court rejected the
proposition that software was merely functional, comprising "no origi-
nal speech expression in and of itself, ' 311 and thus removed from the
confines of the First Amendment. 312 Rather, the court analogized
source code to various forms of "[i]nstructions, do-it-yourself manu-
als, recipes, even technical information about hydrogen bomb con-
306. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1308. ("The new regulations.... are woefully inadequate....
[T]here is no time limit on an application that has been referred to the President .... [M]ost
lacking, are any standards for deciding an application.").
307. The court limited its August holding so that it applied only to Professor Bernstein and his
"Snuffle" algorithm. Id. at 1310. On December 8,1997, however, the government appealed the
ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Does Constitution Protect, supra note 268. Ac-
cording to the reports of the oral arguments, the judges appeared skeptical of the government's
arguments in support of encryption controls. John Markoff, Court Hears Appeal in Encryption
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at D5. According to Stewart Baker of Steptoe & Johnson,
regardless of the skepticism, it is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit will strike down all export con-
trols. Stewart Baker, Ninth Circuit Hearing In The Bernstein Case, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING,
Jan. 13, 1997 (visited Nov. 10, 1998) <http://www.mondaq.com/docs/mainbody/1006257.html>. If
the court does find in favor of Bernstein, its holding will likely be narrowly tailored. Id. In any
case, any decision against the government almost certainly will be appealed to the Supreme
Court. Id. The circuit court is expected to make a decision soon. Jon Swartz, Appeals Court
Hears Encryption Software Case, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 1997, at C1.
308. See supra notes 296-303 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 305 and accompanying text.
310. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N. D. Cal. 1996); see
supra note 263 and accompanying text. The court erred by simply stating software was speech
because it was protected by copyright law. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436. The court failed to
mention that patent law protects software as well. Copyright protects expression, while patent
law protects machines, processes, and tools. Id. Although this debate is relevant, it is too exten-
sive for this Comment.
311. Stender, supra note 2, at 316.
312. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1435.
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struction. ' '313 However, this analogy is flawed. Unlike these written
instructions intended to be read, understood, and followed by
humans, source code acts as a machine that actually carries out the
function intended and as a tool that creates speech, 314 similar to how
pens and paper aid the writer to express ideas. Proposing the pen and
paper are truly the resulting speech is dubious at best.
More importantly, failing to acknowledge cryptography as "a tech-
nology that transforms communication between parties and makes no
original speech expression in and of itself" 315 creates problems of its
own. "It is particularly ill-suited to the realities of computer technol-
ogy because software inseparably incorporates elements of both ex-
pression and function. '316 Cryptography simply lacks the expressive
element required to summon the protections of the First Amendment.
"A critical insight into the First Amendment protection of speech is
that it attaches not to particular things or types of objects (such as
computer source code) but to activities where the free exchange of
information and ideas is at stake (such as publishing and giving a
speech). '"317
The Karn court explicitly stated, "source codes are merely a means
of commanding a computer to perform a function. ' 31 8 The court's
analysis, however, conceded that source code and its comments are
protected speech.319 The court failed to analyze the probability that
the comments themselves were not speech.320 If in fact software is not
speech, the government regulation is not unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds.
313. Id. (citing United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)).
314. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
315. Stender, supra note 2, at 316. See Nguyen, supra note 265, at 677 (proposing that "[t]he
problem with the [Bernstein] court's analysis is that it focuses too narrowly on the nature of
computer source code, rather than looking to the larger social context surrounding the regulated
activities in which software plays a part").
316. Nguyen, supra note 265, at 675-76.
317. Id. at 677-78.
318. Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996). The Court with-
held any judgment regarding whether or not source code without comments are protected by the
First Amendment. Id. at 9 n.19.
319. Id. at 9. "Assuming the source codes and comments are within the arena of protected
speech, the Court must then determine the basis for the regulation at issue in this case." Id. at
10.
320. It is not at issue whether or not object code is speech because this code is simply numbers
for only the computer to interpret. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The object code is
not human readable. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. The issue revolves around
source code and its accompanying comments. The Karn court implied that source code without
comments would not classify as speech. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10 n.19. At issue, then, is whether
or not software with comments is speech. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, "software"
and "source code" implies that author-written comments are included.
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As a computer program, software enables one machine to perform
the functions of many machines.321 "When a word processing pro-
gram is operating in a computer, the computer is a word processor.
When a videogame program is operating in a computer, the computer
is a videogame machine. When a digital watch program is operating
in a computer, the computer is a digital watch. '' 322 When an encryp-
tion software program is operating in a computer, the computer is a
cryptographer. A computer program makes a new machine structure.
By the classical definition, a machine is a set of devices configured to
perform a specific function;323 "'one employs motors, levers, gears,
and wire to print newspapers; another uses motors, levers, gears, and
wire to play a prerecorded song."' 324
A computer is also made by configuring a set of devices, but its
function is not implied by that configuration. It acquires its function
only when someone programs it.325 This program is in turn called
software.326 Proponents of "software is speech" would not suggest
that the "motors, levers, gears and wires" creating a newspaper is
speech protected by the First Amendment. The same proponents
would not propose that the "motors, levers, gears, and wire" are
speech when operating to play a song. The proponents of "software is
speech," however, continue to argue that a software program is
speech when functioning to create a cryptographic machine.327 Since
World War II, machines have been transformed though program-
ming. 328 For example, the ENIAC,329 the first general-purpose elec-
tronic computer, was manually programmed using wiring and
mechanical switches to decipher coded German communications dur-
ing the war. 330 The attaching of cables made new circuitry, i.e., a spe-
321. Samuelson, supra note 21, at 680.
322. Id.
323. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
324. James R. Goodman et al., The Alappat Standard for Determining that Programmed Com-
puters are Patentable Subject Matter, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFs. Soc'y 771, 782 (1994)
(quoting Paul Ceruzzi, An Unforseen Revolution: Computers and Expectations, 1935-1985, in
IMAGINING TOMORROW: HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 187, 196 (Jo-
seph J. Corn ed., 1986)).
325. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 246-48, 275-77 and accompanying text.
328. Goodman et al., supra note 324, at 773.
329. See supra note 24.
330. See CHARLES BASHE ET AL., IBM's EARLY COMPUTERS, 1-33 (1986); Arthur W. Burks &
Alice R. Burks, The ENIAC: First General Purpose Computer, ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 310
(1981); see also Ceruzzi, supra note 324, at 189 (showing a photograph of the ENIAC program-
ming). "This rewiring essentially changed it into a new machine for each new problem it
solved." Id. at 196.
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cial purpose computer, thereby transforming the ENIAC into a
decoding machine. 331 Just as the wiring and mechanical switches that
created the decoding machine were not speech then, the encryption
software that creates the cryptography machines is not speech today.
B. Is "Cryptographese" Protected Speech?
If the courts determine encryption source code is speech, it is not
speech protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
clearly asserted that not all speech remains protected by the First
Amendment.332 Speech receives or loses protection based in part on
its determined value. 333 Categorizing software and its source code will
assist in determining its constitutional value. Concededly, the categor-
ical characteristics are not clear.334 Applying consistently recognized
Supreme Court categories confirms the conclusion that software can-
not be protected under the First Amendment.
First, source code is not high-value political speech.335 In New York
Times v. Sullivan,336 the Court found compelling the need to en-
courage statements, even if false or erroneous statements, in the inter-
est of promoting free debate.337 Encryption source code does not
promote the "debate on public issues,' 338 or "sharp attacks on govern-
ment ''339 or any other political figure. Moreover, it does not en-
courage "free flow of information and opinion about matters of public
concern [which] is essential to effective self-government. '340 Simply
stated, source code is not "core" value speech.341 At best, software
remains a "lower-valued" classification of speech.342
331. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
333. See Shaman, supra note 107, at 298.
334. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
335. See Shaman, supra note 107, at 333 (restating Alexander Meiklejohn's view of the central
purpose of freedom of speech). "[T]he central purpose of freedom of speech and the press is to
enable individuals to participate in our democratic system of self-government." Id.
336. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra note 120 for the factual background of Sullivan and the
Supreme Court's reasoning for protecting the political speech.
337. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; see supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
338. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; see supra text accompanying note 121.
339. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
340. Shaman, supra note 107, at 333. Arguably, source code comments could include such
expressions. The proliferation of political speech, however, is not the intended use of source
code, nor is source code currently utilized for such a purpose. Notably, even if source code did
include political speech, the government regulations would pass constitutional muster because of
the harm it caused, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text, and because of its ability to
satisfy the O'Brien test, see infra Part V.C.
341. See GuNTHER, supra note 108, at 999-1002 (discussing various approaches to valuing
speech).
342. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
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Clearly, speech does not have to be political to warrant First
Amendment protection. Yet, software does not warrant protection
under a less protected category. For example, commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment, albeit to a lesser degree than
political speech.343 Computer software does not promote a commer-
cial transaction, which is granted an intermediate level of protec-
tion.344 Neither source code nor its accompanying comments function
as an advertisement, mention a specific product by name, or are cre-
ated with economic motivations. 345 The software developer may write
code with a partial objective of financial gain. The third factor, eco-
nomic motivation, is not satisfied simply by the placement of a price
tag. If this were true, arguably every textbook mentioning a product
would be classified as commercial speech. Thus, computer software
does not satisfy the elements defining commercial speech.
Lastly, encryption software does not even qualify for protection as
low-value speech, which warrants some protection by the First
Amendment.346 The government should be able to regulate some ac-
tivities accomplished through speech.347 Professor Frederick Schauer
explains that "[n]ot only do we fix prices with speech, but we also
make contracts with speech,... extort with speech, threaten with
speech, and place bets with speech. '348 These activities do not present
a clear and present danger, nor does the government have a particu-
larly compelling interest in prohibiting them. 349 Their constitutional
governmental regulation, therefore, can only be explained under the
low-value speech theory. These classes of speech "are to be tested
under drastically different standards of protection" than other speech
afforded greater First Amendment value. 350
Assuming for argument's sake that software is afforded minimal
protections as low-value speech, cryptographic software is one form of
speech the government should be able to regulate. Software is not
343. Shaman, supra note 107, at 319; see supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
344. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973) (holding a mere proposal of possible employment is not protected by the First Amend-
ment); see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (holding a statute making it illegal to advertise prescription drug prices an un-
constitutional violation of protected commercial speech).
345. See supra text accompanying note 121 for a detailed list of factors the Court considers
characteristic of commercial speech.
346. See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 602.
347. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 265, 270-72 (1981).
348. Id. at 270.
349. Id. at 271.
350. Id. at 271-72.
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worthless in the sense of its functionality, but its alleged expressive
content is "worthless or of de minimis value to society."' 351 Society
generally is not concerned with what the software is communicating to
the computer or what the source code comments convey to a
reader.352 The concern is simply that the software does what it is sup-
posed to do.353
Classified as low-value speech, cryptographic software is worthy of
only minimal scrutiny.354 The government, therefore, need only es-
tablish a "valid or legitimate state interest achieved through reason-
able means. ' 355 There is a legitimate state interest in national
security. 356 The licensing regulation of encryption is a reasonable
means of achieving such an interest.
Opponents to cryptography controls argue that criminals have in-
ternational means of obtaining strong encryption technology and
therefore the United States government need not enforce export re-
strictions. This reasoning, however, does not justify further prolifera-
tion through United States channels. 357 J. Terrence Stender, former
United States Navy cryptologist and signals intelligence situation ana-
lyst, suggested that the United States should restrict the export of en-
cryption, as well as any other military-related technology regardless of
its availability from foreign suppliers.358 Stender poses a variety of
rhetorical questions on this proposition worthy of serious considera-
tion: "Should the United States allow the export of sophisticated mis-
351. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 (1992).
352. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 682; see supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
354. Shaman, supra note 107, at 330.
355. Id.
356. See supra Part II.C.
357. See Stender, supra note 2, at 322. But see United States v. Progressive, Inc., 610 F.2d 819
(7th Cir. 1979). On March 26, 1979, the Wisconsin district court issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the publication of Howard Morland's article on how to build a hydrogen bomb pur-
suant to the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2280. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The court further held that even in the absence of the Atomic
Energy Act, the injunction would be justified as a means of preventing irreparable harm to the
United States. id. The government's suit was dismissed while pending before the Seventh Cir-
cuit, however. Progressive, 610 F.2d at 819. Professor Stone believes that the dismissal occurred
because other writers published materials providing similar instructions. Stone, supra note 157,
at 1034. I would like to thank Professor Rodney Blackmun for his insight on the Progressive
case.
358. Stender, supra note 2, at 322 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, EXPORT CONTROLS AND NONPROLIFERATION POLICY O.T.A.-ISS-596, 56 (1994)).
While it is recognized that a significant number of encryption programs are already
available from non-U.S. sources worldwide, and in many cases obtained quite cheaply
and easily, it would appear not to be in the best interests of the United States, as a pure
security matter, to contribute to the proliferation of encryption.
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sile technology, just because it just so happens that the Chinese and
the Russians have similar systems available on the open market?...
Why help an already bad situation get worse?" 359 Arguing the elimi-
nation of export controls on cryptography simply because it is avail-
able in foreign nations is analogous to encouraging the elimination of
drug enforcement simply because drugs are available through interna-
tional suppliers.
As mentioned earlier, the government perceives the proliferation of
encryption technology as a harmful threat to national security.360 Ap-
plying the definitional balancing approach to this form of low-value
speech, the courts may uphold the federal export regulation upon
finding the proliferation of encryption software harmful.361 The court
does not have to find actual harm.362 Finding speech threatens the
exposure of United States coding systems to foreign intelligence,
thereby causing loss of control and secrecy of United States govern-
ment codes and confidential information, and arming foreign ter-
rorists with a tool to carry out attack missions,363 is enough evidence
to establish harmful speech. Even under the low-value speech theory,
therefore, encryption software does not violate the First Amendment.
The government encryption export regulations have also been chal-
lenged as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.364 The
Supreme Court in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.
required a finding of a "close enough nexus to expression or to con-
duct commonly associated with expression" to invalidate a prior re-
straint.365  Encryption software has little expressive value. 366
Moreover, the software is not "commonly associated with expres-
sion. ' 367 "Software ... empowers a computer to handle information
and to control information flow," 3 6 8 and is commonly distributed for
its non-expressive purposes of providing a compiler with enough in-
formation to produce executable computer programs. 369 Addition-
ally, for a law to be invalidated as a prior restraint, the Court must be
359. Id.
360. See supra Part II.C.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 164-67 (noting that definitional balancing applies to
low-value speech).
362. See Shaman, supra note 107, at 331.
363. See supra Part II.C.
364. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
365. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988); see supra notes
227-30 and accompanying text.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47, 310-31.
367. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760-61.
368. STOBBS, supra note 30, at 50.
369. Id. at 170.
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persuaded that the regulated conduct offers more than a mere possi-
bility of expressive nature. 370 Exporting encryption software may at
times be exported for expressive reasons. Regardless, more than a
mere possibility is required. Simply because exporting software may
on occasion be expressive is not enough to implicate the prior re-
straint doctrine.
The Supreme Court applies the categorization approach to assess-
ing levels of protection on speech. Other justifications have been pro-
posed in support of the First Amendment freedom of speech, such as
the creation of an open marketplace of ideas and promoting self-de-
velopment. 371 Software does not liken to any of these categories.
Computer scientists consider source code comments a kind of "margi-
nal note" the programmer makes to himself.372 The comments by no
means facilitate the "marketplace of ideas" 373 or promote self-devel-
opment. They are not statements critical of the government 374 or any
other subject of public debate. In fact, it has been said that the user
does not care what the program says, as long as it "does what it is
supposed to do."'375
As Professor Alexander Meiklejohn observed, the First Amend-
ment does not prohibit the abridging of speech, but abridging the free-
dom of speech.376 "The values perceived in a system of free
expression will be determinative of whether there exists an inhibition
upon that freedom. '377 In sum, the values and functions of freedom
of expression are numerous. "First, freedom of expression is essential
as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment .... [Second, it] is an
essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth....
[Third, it] is essential to provide for participation in decision making
by all members of society. ' 37 8 Computer software does not facilitate
any such functions.
370. See Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 303 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding sitting on side-
walks as not subject to facial prior restraint challenge even though sitting on city sidewalks may
at times be expressive); see supra Part III.E.
371. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785-88 (2d ed. 1988).
372. Samuelson, supra note 21, at 685.
373. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
375. Samuelson, supra note 21, at 682.
376. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 19
(1948) ("The First Amendment is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness.").
377. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 105, at 940.
378. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970).
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C. Is Encryption Expressive Conduct?
If the court finds encryption software is speech, it should only afford
limited protection as expressive conduct.379 Conceding for argument's
sake that the encryption source code contained on a disk is speech, the
government is suppressing the conduct of encryption with an element
of speech. The government does not regulate the encryption conduct
because of its expressive value, as it does not restrict the export of the
encryption process because of the expressive message the software
may include. Instead, the government regulates the export of encryp-
tion software simply to protect national security. Any impact on ex-
pression is incidental to "permissible export controls on a commodity
that can function to encrypt communications. '380 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has held that where the government suppresses
speech incidental to conduct, the content-neutral regulation is not per
se unconstitutional and O'Brien applies.381
The Karn court correctly found that the government satisfied all
elements of the O'Brien test.382 It has been conceded that the govern-
ment had the authority to regulate the export of defense articles. 383
Also, whether the governmental has a substantial interest in protect-
ing critical foreign intelligence is not at issue.384 The third element
required the encryption software controls to be unrelated to the sup-
pression of speech.385 As stated in Karn, the government in the en-
cryption regulation cases correctly argued that "[tihe encryption
source codes on [the] disks are not regulated because of any scientific
ideas that are implicit in them. The focus of the regulation is on the
function of a commodity." 386
379. In O'Brien, the government constitutionally prohibited the act of destroying draft cards.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The government's purpose was unrelated to regu-
lating pure, free speech, but intended to ensure that the draft cards were made available for
government tracking purposes. Id. at 378-82. Similarly, the government is now regulating the
act of strong encryption processes without key recovery systems. The government's purpose is
unrelated to regulating pure protected speech. See supra text accompanying note 72. The act of
encryption happens to be in the form of a diskette. Notably, the form of the expression is irrele-
vant if the government's interest is unrelated to suppressing free speech. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
377.
380. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or
in the alternative, For Summary Judgment at 5, Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F.
Supp. 1 (D.C.C. 1996) (visited Oct. 19, 1997) <http://people.Qualcomm.com/karn/export/
memorandum.html>.
381. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
382. Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1996).
383. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
384. See supra Part I1.C.
385. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
386. Defendant's Motion at 5, Karn.
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Arguably, it is the fourth element, requiring narrowly tailored
means, that has caused much of the controversy. The government re-
stricted the export of encryption source code on disk, yet it does not
restrict the export of source code in written form.387 This is justified,
however, because the government does not desire to completely sup-
press the international sharing of encryption code.388 Rather, the gov-
ernment merely regulates the form of the code that can be exported to
foreign nations. 38 9 Therefore, regulating the code in disk form and
not in print limits the suppression of alleged First Amendment free-
doms. The incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment
freedoms is "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of" ensur-
ing national security. 390
D. Separation of Powers
The government regulations on encryption software as a means of
ensuring national security raises the question of a proper separation of
powers. This doctrine dictates that
[T]he scope of the judicial function on passing upon the activities of
the Executive Branch ... in the field of foreign affairs is very nar-
rowly restricted .... [In this limited power,] the judiciary must re-
view the initial executive determination to the point of satisfying
itself that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the
proper compass of the President's foreign relations power.... [T]he
judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure
of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security
be made by the head of the Executive Department concerned [af-
ter] actual personal consideration by that officer. 391
387. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 5.
388. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. The government reasonably believes that
the threat to national security derives from providing foreign programmers with the actual en-
cryption code in functional form. The written form does not pose the same threat of use, unlike
the disk. The written form requires manipulation and manual labor to effectuate the process.
The process of converting the software from written form into a usable electronic form increases
the risk of errors in the program. If in fact the conversion program contains errors, or bugs, the
encryption process will fail to operate as the likelihood of collecting bugs in a program is great
and the time to locate and correct bugs is extensive. See Samuelson, supra note 21, at 686-87
(stating that "[t]o locate the source of the errors and to correct them almost takes longer than
writing the source code"). Arguably software source code in written form is less threatening to
security than executable code on an operational diskette. But see Interview with Edward Apell,
supra note 60 (suggesting that the wide distribution of encryption in either book or disk form is a
national security threat as the book can be scanned into the computer and run to instruct the
computer what to do, thus acting as the machine that it was meant to be).
390. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 11-12 (noting that the plaintiff had not articulated any present
barrier to the spreading of information on cryptography "by any other means" other than those
containing encryption source code on machine-readable media).
391. New York Times v. Sullivan, 403 U.S. 713, 758 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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According to Justice Harlan's dissent in New York Times v. Sulli-
van,3 92 however, "the judiciary may not properly go beyond these two
inquiries and re-determine for itself the probable impact of disclosure
on the national security: '393
The very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is polit-
ical, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Consti-
tution to the political departments .... They are delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility
and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.394
The government regulations on encryption software remain subject
to Justice Harlan's above criticism. The judiciary has attempted to
restrain the Executive Branch from enacting legislation with the pur-
pose of protecting national security. In fact, the Karn-Bernstein line
of cases "present[ ] a classic example of how the courts today, particu-
larly the federal courts, can become needlessly invoked, whether in
the national interest or not, in litigation involving policy decisions
made within the power of the President or another branch of the
government. '395
VI. IMPACT
A. Constitutional Impact
On July 2, 1998, approximately two years after Karn and Bernstein,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
filed its first encryption software opinion.396 The court addressed
whether encryption source code was expression protected under the
First Amendment, whether the Export Regulations acted as a prior
restraint on speech subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny,
and if not, whether the regulations survived intermediate scrutiny. 397
Finding the Export Regulations constitutional, the court reasoned that
encryption source code is inherently functional, the regulations were
not directed at source code's expressive elements, and the Export
392. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 757.
394. Id. at 757-58 (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948)).
395. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 2.
396. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
397. Id. at 711-12.
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Regulations did not apply to printed software or academic discussions
of software. 398
Junger filed a complaint against the Department of Commerce in
the Northern District Court of Ohio.399 He claimed, as did Karn and
Bernstein, that the government regulations on encryption export vio-
lated his First Amendment rights.400 Notably, however, unlike the
complaints in Bernstein and Karn, Junger did not challenge per se the
constitutionality of the licensing scheme's requirement of obtaining a
license before exporting cryptographic devices. Instead, he argued
that to require a license before one could communicate information
violated the Constitution.401
Plaintiff Junger was a law professor at Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity Law School in Cleveland, Ohio.40 2 He maintained a web site
on the Internet that provided information about his courses to be read
or downloaded. 40 3 He also wanted to publish his course book, articles,
and other material on computers and the law, but these materials con-
tained encryption software.404 The government required Junger to
obtain a license for his materials containing encryption code. 40 5 This
requirement, Junger claimed, acted as a prior restraint in violation of
the First Amendment.40 6
398. Id. at 712.
399. Id. at 711.
400. Id. Junger taught a course in 1996, "Computers and the Law." Id. at 713. In addition to
teaching his course, Junger created a web site for teaching and enabling anyone interested in his
courses and topics to visit. Id. at 713-14. As a result of the transfer of encryption control to the
Department of Commerce, Junger inquired whether his teaching, research or publication in his
book and/or on his web site would be affected. Id. at 714. The government confirmed that the
licensing requirement applied to specific items. Id. Junger applied for commodity classifications
for encryption computer programs, the first chapter of his textbook, and other items of interest
to him. Id. The government required a license to export all but one of Junger's programs. Id.
The government did not, however, require a license to export the first chapter of the textbook.
Id.
401. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
402. Id. at 713.
403. Id. at 713-14. Junger's web site also included documents prepared for this litigation. Id.
at 714. His web site can be found at <http://samsara.LAW.CWRU.Edu/comp-law/vd/>.
404. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
405. Id.
406. Id. The essence of Junger's claim resulted from a strict interpretation of the provisions
regarding what exactly constituted an export. Id. The Export Regulations control the "export"
of specified software. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. "Export" of encryption
source code is defined by the Export Regulations as "downloading, or causing the downloading
of, such software to locations ... outside the United States ... unless the person making the
software available takes precautions adequate to prevent unauthorized transfer of such code
outside the United States." 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9) (1998); see supra notes 83-87 and accompa-
nying text. Junger sought to post encryption programs on his web site. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at
714. As a classified "export," such posting required a license. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9). Ex-
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The court first determined whether the export of encryption
software source code was expressive speech protected by the First
Amendment. 407 Concluding that the source code was not constitu-
tionally protected, the court stated: "[A]lthough encryption source
code may occasionally be expressive, its export is not protected con-
duct under the First Amendment. ' 40 8 The court reasoned that encryp-
tion software is inherently functional 40 9 as opposed to expressive.410
Emphasizing that the source code does not simply explain a crypto-
graphic process, the court found that the software "carries out the
function of encryption. '411 Finally, the court pointed out that where
encryption source code is exported, a majority of the time the transfer
is for non-communicative purposes.412 "For the broad majority of
persons receiving such source code, the value comes from the function
the source code does." 413
Addressing Bernstein, Junger found the court's reasoning "un-
sound. '414 The Junger court opined that Bernstein erred in finding
language was per se protected speech.415 "'Speech' is not protected
simply because we write it in a language. Instead, what determines
whether the First Amendment protects something is whether it ex-
presses ideas. '416
The court further criticized the analysis of functionality in Bernstein
I as it related to source code. 417 "Unlike instructions, a manual, or a
recipe, source code actually performs the function it describes. While
port Classification Number 5D002 covered four out of the five programs Junger had submitted
and were therefore subject to the Export Regulations. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 714. See supra
text accompanying notes 81-82 for a detailed explanation of the Export Classification Numbers.
407. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
408. Id.
409. Id. The court defined inherently functional software as code utilized to perform tasks
with "scant concern for the methods employed or the software language used to control such
methods." Id.
410. Id. "Like much computer software, encryption source code is inherently functional; it is
designed to enable a computer to do a designated task." Id.
411. Id. "The software is essential to carry out the function of encryption. In doing this func-
tion, the encryption software is indistinguishable from dedicated computer hardware that does
encryption." Id.
412. Id.
413. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
414. Id. (quoting Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal.
1996)).
415. Id.
416. Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), and Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
417. Id. at 717 (noting that the court's classification of source code in Bernstein I as "purely
functional," 922 F. Supp. at 1435, is inconsistent with its comparison of source code to instruc-
tions and manual-type guidebooks).
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a recipe provides instructions to a cook, source code is a device, like
embedded circuitry in a telephone, that actually does the function of
encryption. '418
Following the discussion of functionality, Junger conceded that the
conduct of exporting software may occasionally possess communica-
tive characteristics. 419 The court, however, qualified this finding by
stating that "merely because conduct is occasionally expressive, does
not necessarily extend First Amendment protection to it. '' 420 Deter-
mining whether occasionally expressive conduct is protected by the
First Amendment, the court introduced the standards set forth in
Spence v. Washington,421 and applied in both Texas v. Johnson422 and
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.423
In Spence, the Court required that "[a]n intent to convey a particu-
larized message [must be] present, and in the surrounding circum-
stances the likelihood [must be] great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."' 424 Applying this standard,
Junger held source code was not sufficiently expressive. 425 Unlike the
communication in both Johnson and Tinker, the expressive nature of
encryption source code is not "overwhelmingly apparent. '426 "Be-
cause the expressive elements of encryption source code are neither
'unmistakable' nor 'overwhelmingly apparent,' its export is not pro-
tected conduct under the First Amendment. '427
The final argument entertained by the Junger court was whether the
Export Regulations were facially invalid as an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech.428 Junger recognized that prior restraints are pre-
sumptively suspect before the court.429 In order to be invalidated, the
prior restraint "must have a close enough nexus to expression, or to
418. Id.
419. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
420. Id. The court cited City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), for the proposition that
"[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity-for example, walking
down the street or meeting one's friends at the shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient
to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 25.
421. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
422. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In Johnson, the defendant burned an American flag in government
protest. Id. at 406. Johnson intended that others, and in fact others did, understand his message.
Id. See supra note 170 for additional background and explanation of the Johnson case.
423. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, students wore black armbands in effort to express an
unmistakable protest against the United States' participation in the Vietnam War. Id. at 505-06.
424. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
425. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 717-18.
428. Id. at 718.
429. Id.
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and sub-
stantial threat" of censorship. 430 Furthermore, the court cited Rou-
lette v. City of Seattle431 for the proposition that "[t]he mere fact that
regulated conduct possibly can be expressive is not enough to invali-
date a law on its face on prior restraint grounds. ' 432 Applying the
Lakewood and Roulette standards, the Junger court concluded that ex-
porting encryption source code was not conduct "commonly associ-
ated with expression. '433 Although the code can be exported for non-
expressive reasons, it is commonly transferred for the sole purpose of
mandating a computer's operation, a non-expressive activity.434 Typi-
cally, software exportation simply is non-expressive. 435 Finally, the
court reasoned that the government regulation did not work a facially
unconstitutional prior restraint because the regulations were not "di-
rected narrowly and specifically" at the expressive export of encryp-
tion source code. 436 Under the Export Regulations, encryption
software is not treated differently than any other encryption technol-
ogy.437 Such technology remains subject to the licensing scheme. 438
"[T]he Export Regulations allow academic discussion and descriptions
of software in print media while restricting the export of software that
can actually encrypt data. '439
In conclusion, the Junger court found that the government's regula-
tions did not work a prior restraint on protected expression. 440 First,
Junger failed to present a valid facial challenge to the government's
licensing scheme. 441 Second, the regulations were not narrowly fo-
cused as expressive conduct.442
The Junger decision has effectively "tipped the judicial scale" in
favor of finding encryption export regulations constitutional. As a re-
sult of the Karn, Bernstein, and Junger opinions, future courts have a
variety of approaches to explore. If courts follow the Karn line of
430. Id. (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988)).
431. 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996). In Roulette, an ordinance prohibited the act of sitting on the
sidewalks to deter expressive acts of activists and street performers. Id. at 302. Although sitting
on city sidewalks may occasionally be expressive, the law was not found unconstitutional be-
cause the conduct is not "integral to, or commonly associated with, expression." Id, at 304.
432. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (citing Roulette, 97 F.3d at 303).
433. Id. (quoting Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759).
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. (citing Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760).
437. 15 C.F.R. § 742.15 (1998).
438. Id.
439. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 718-19.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
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reasoning, they will agree that exporting encryption software is ex-
pressive conduct subject to the O'Brien test of intermediate scru-
tiny.443 Under the this test, the courts must find that the government
satisfied the four requirements. As argued above, the government has
the authority to regulate exports, the regulation clearly furthers im-
portant and substantial governmental interests of national security,444
the government's purpose remains unrelated to regulating free
speech,445 and the regulation is no greater than necessary to further
the national security concern. 446
A second option, the Junger line of reasoning, requires a judicial
finding that exporting encryption source code is not protected conduct
under the First Amendment.447 The source code may be occasionally
expressive, but has an inherently functional quality.448 Furthermore,
the court must find that the government Export Regulations fail to
work a prior restraint on expressive conduct.449
The Karn and Junger holdings facilitate government prevention of
uncontrollable strong cryptographic technology while maintaining do-
mestic and international demands for effective cryptography. 450 Ap-
plying the Bernstein line of reasoning is not a highly recommended
option, however. "Judge Patel's decision amounted to summary exe-
cution of controls on the proliferation of strong crypto.' '451 National
security is a serious and very real concern of the United States govern-
ment. 452 Simply dismissing with slight of hand the government's inter-
est in controlling the proliferation of harmful material for the right to
speak cryptographically would put national security severally at risk.
A computer scientist from Georgetown University warns that immu-
443. See supra Part IV.A.
444. See supra Part II.C.
445. See supra Part V.C.
446. See supra Part V.
447. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 718; see supra notes 406-42 and accompanying text.
448. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716; see supra notes 408-13 and accompanying text.
449. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 719; see supra notes 428-42 and accompanying text.
450. "[E]xport controls, intended to restrict the international availability of U.S. cryptography
technology and products, are now being joined with domestic cryptography initiatives intended
to preserve U.S. law-enforcement and signals-intelligence capabilities." Stender, supra note 2, at
326 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY
AND PRIVACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 9-10 (1994)).
451. Stender, supra note 2, at 315.
452. See FBI Says Senate Encryption Bill Could Jeopardize National Security, COMM. TODAY,
July 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Comtdy File; see also Judy Fahys, Cryptic Cod-
ing: Export Quarrel Touches Utah Coding: Conflict about Sales and Spies, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan.
28, 1996, at F2 ("The proliferation of encryption of technology threatens the ability of law en-
forcement and national security officials to protect the nation's citizens against terrorists, as well
as organized criminals, drug traffickers and other violent criminals.") (quoting James Cava-
naugh, National Security Agency's Deputy Director of Public Policy).
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nization from lawful interception is a dangerous road to follow: "We
would have havoc in the United States . . . . Lawlessness would
prevail. "453
One additional point needs to be made regarding the balancing of
harms. A mistaken ruling in favor of the government would curtail
the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. A mistaken judgment against
the government, however, could open the flood gates to illegal activity
and uncontrollable danger to citizens such as those victims of the
Oklahoma bombing and the World Trade Center.454 Furthermore,
software developers have other means of sharing their encryption
codes with foreign nations. As the district court in United States v.
Progressive, Inc. found,
Because of this "disparity of risk," because the government has met
its heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of a
prior restraint, and because the court is unconvinced that suppres-
sion .. .would in any plausible fashion impede the defendants in
their laudable crusade to stimulate public knowledge of the nuclear
armament and bring about enlightened debate on national policy
questions, the court finds that the objected-to portions of the article
fall within the narrow area recognized by the Court in Near v.
Minnesota.455
B. Political Impact
As the courts review and decide encryption software cases, the con-
troversy flows through Congress in attempt to sever the governmental
impasse. According to Marcia Smith of the Science Policy Research
Division of the Congressional Research Service, "the controversy is
over what access the government should have to encrypted stored
computer data or electronic communications (voice and data, wired
and wireless) for law enforcement purposes. ' 456 A hearty section of
Congressional members strongly promote relaxing export regulations.
With equal force, the National Security Agency and the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation vigorously attack relaxation proposals.457 If and
when Karn, Bernstein, and Junger are appealed to the Supreme Court,
the Court's decision regarding First Amendment protection of
453. Dorothy Denning, The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime, NEWSDAY, Feb. 22, 1994, at 35.
454. The government claims bombing attacks can be intercepted and prevented through the
use of key recovery systems. Smith, supra note 2, at 13.
455. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
456. Smith, supra note 2, at Summary.
457. See Does Constitution Protect, supra note 268, at 6D (quoting Barry Steinhardt, President
of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and sponsor of the Bernstein trial).
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software will dramatically affect the factors considered throughout the
Congressional debate.458
Many proposed bills that argue for relaxation of encryption export
controls are presently before Congress. These proposals are more
concerned with monetary gain or international trade,459 as opposed to
the judiciaries' constitutional concerns. 460 Three pieces of legislation
before the 105th Congress challenge the government's export regula-
tions on encryption technology. 461
Senator Conrad Burns of Montana introduced the Pro-CODE 462
Act of 1997 bill, which basically proposes an elimination of export
controls on encryption technology.463 The bill prohibits mandatory
key recovery and liberalizes export controls by requiring reports sub-
mitted to the Secretary of Congress after the product has already been
exported as opposed to a condition of obtaining a license.464 Clearly,
the intent of the bill is to eliminate export control of encryption
technology.
A second proposed bill relating to the export of encryption technol-
ogy is Senator Patrick Leahy's Encrypted Communications Privacy
Act of 1997 ("ECPA"). 465 The ECPA is similar to Burns' Pro-CODE
in that it targets export regulations. The ECPA varies in numerous
ways. First, if a key recovery system was used, the ECPA would per-
458. One opponent of strict governmental regulations predicts a commercial impact and soci-
etal use impact:
At stake in the broad debate over the export of encryption software is the use of en-
cryption by U.S. citizens at home. Legal experts say that as long as domestic manufac-
turers are prevented from exporting strong encryption products abroad, they will not
manufacture and distribute those same wares in the United States, where the use of
encryption is legal.
Does Constitution Protect, supra note 268, at 6D (quoting Barry Steinhardt). If finding software
protected speech results in complete decontrol of exporting encryption technology, law enforce-
ment and national security intelligence members strongly suggest that criminals, terrorists, and
foreign intelligence targets of interest would eventually disappear and move completely unde-
tected. See Hoffman, supra note 102, at 549. In effect, Congress would severely handicap the
government's ability to maintain and protect security of the United States and its citizens. Id.
459. See Smith, supra note 2, at 8-10; Showdown on Encryption, supra note 233, at C6.
460. The government's response to any attempt to weaken export controls on encryption
software, however, is one of a national security concern. See supra Part II.C.
461. See Smith, supra note 2, at 8-10.
462. Pro-CODE essentially stands for: "The Promotion of Commerce On-line in the Digital
Era Act." S. 377, 105th Cong. (1997).
463. See S. 377. For a summary of the bill's specific elements, see Smith, supra note 2, at 10, or
Bill Summary and Status Information, Digest, § 377 (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d105:SN00377:@@@L>.
464. S. 377.
465. S. 376, 105th Cong. (1997). For a summary of the specifics of the bill, see Smith, supra
note 2, at 9-10.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
mit law enforcement access to keys under court order.466 Second, any
United States individual may use encryption in any state or foreign
country, regardless of the software's strength.467 Third, ECPA would
criminalize using encryption products to obstruct justice.468 Finally,
the ECPA would protect as well as penalize "key holders. ' 469
A third bill addressing the export of encryption technology is
known as the Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act
("SAFE"). Introduced by Representative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia,
SAFE also reduces export controls on encryption products.470 Specifi-
cally, the bill relaxes controls on products available through interna-
tional markets.471 Similar to the other proposed bills, SAFE prohibits
mandatory use of key recovery, permits free use of any strength en-
cryption produce, and creates criminal sanctions for using encryption
to obstruct justice.472
The above mentioned bills advocate relaxing export controls on en-
cryption products. Senator Leahy stated, "[t]hese bills ... roll back
current restrictions on the export of strong cryptography so that high-
tech U.S. firms are free to compete in the global marketplace and
meet the demands of customers-both foreign and domestic-for
strong encryption. '473 The future success of any of these proposals is
difficult to predict. Apparently, the congressional and constitutional
challenges present a trend in relaxing export controls without com-
plete decontrol.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cryptography is an essential tool for ensuring secured communica-
tions. Unfortunately, such technology is occasionally utilized to priva-
tize messages intended to harm or (worse yet) destroy individuals,
society, the government, or any other targeted victim. Controlling the
proliferation of cryptography enables the government to intercept, de-
cipher, and potentially trace a message back to a potential terrorist,
drug trafficker, or other felonious agents before the victim is harmed.
466. S. 376, § 2802.
467. Id. § 2805.
468. Id. § 2804.
469. Id. § 2802; see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (explaining the key recovery
mechanism).
470. H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1997). For a summary of the bill's specific elements, see Smith,
supra note 2, at 8-9.
471. H.R. 695, § 2803.
472. Id. §§ 2803-05.
473. Encryption Bills Make Their Way Back to Capitol Hill, COMM. TODAY, Feb. 28, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Comtdy File.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
In efforts to control cryptography, the government placed regulations
on the export of cryptographic software on computer disks. These
regulations have been challenged as an unconstitutional violation of
the First Amendment.
Plaintiffs Bernstein, Karn, and Junger constitutionally challenged
the United States government's regulation of encryption technology.
They essentially argued that the government licensing scheme
shackles their First Amendment right to speak freely. The Bernstein
court found the government regulations worked a prior restraint on
protected speech. The Karn court similarly held that software is
speech protected under the First Amendment. Most recently, the
Junger court found, inter alia, that the government's export regula-
tions were constitutional. The court concluded that the regulations
were not directed at expressive speech.
The government does not deny companies and the general public's
justifiable demand for utilizing strong encryption. The First Amend-
ment, however, should not function as a vehicle to completely divest
the government's imperative control in this area. "First Amendment
protections for pure speech are justifiably far-reaching; however,
crypto is hard pressed to fall within those protections because it lacks
the expression needed to invoke those protections. 474
Yvonne C. Ocrant
474. Stender, supra note 2, at 317.
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